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STUDENTS AND DUE PROCESS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: OF INTERESTS
AND PROCEDURES
Fernand N. Dutiles
I. INTRODUCTION
In the process of enforcing their academic and disciplinary standards,
colleges and universities increasingly find themselves confronting the
possibility and even the reality of litigation. At public institutions, of course,
the strictures of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' loom
especially large. Meeting the complex needs of their institutions and students
as well as the expectations of American courts presents an ongoing and
daunting challenge to higher education personnel.
For both internal and external reasons, institutional dealings with
aberrant students in public higher education has, over the years, developed
on a dual track. Courts themselves have generally treated disciplinary action
against students as subject to significant procedural due process although, in
typical due process fashion, the quantum of process has varied according to
the student interest threatened by institutional action. Academic sanctions
have occasioned greater deference from the courts. In such situations,
courts, though acknowledging that even here institutional action might be
judicially trumped, have accorded universities great leeway in determining
both the need for and the extent of any sanction.
This Article will discuss the (relatively few) building blocks provided
by the U.S. Supreme Court for this area of the law. It will then assess the
interests that come within the protection of due process and describe the
procedures enforceable against state institutions. 2
Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School A.B., Assumption College, 1962;J.D., Notre
Dame Law School, 1965. Admitted to the Maine Bar, 1965.
' "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
ofaw ...... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S1.
2 Since this Article addresses the requirements of due process, its lessons reflect the minimum
that state institutions may provide their students. Of course, colleges and universities should seek to
do the wise and the right, in addition to the compelled. For a "document that can serve as a starting
point for code revisions at a broad range of campuses," see Gary Pavela,App." the PoxwofAssodaion
ox Cavs. :A Mode/Code ofStmdent CoxC, 11 SYNTHESIs: LAw& POLICY IN HIGHER EDUc. 817 (2000)
[hereinafter Pavela]. Set alo Gary Pavela, Appjmig the Power of Assodatiox on Cttius: A Model Code of
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II. THE SUPREME COURTS GUIDELINES: GOSS, INGRAHAM,
HOROWITZ, AND EVING
A. The Disciplinary Cases: Goss and Ingraham
The U.S. Supreme Court's first major pronouncement on the
relationship of due process to institutional dealings with students occurred
in Goss v. Lope. In Goss, students subjected to short suspensions for a
variety of miscreance brought a class action against school officials, arguing
that due process guaranteed hearings prior to such suspensions. The U.S.
Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, agreed.
The Court found both a property interest and a liberty interest
implicated by the suspensions. Noting that independent sources such as state
statutes and rules usually create and define constitutionally protected property
interests,4 the Court saw such an interest in Ohio's statutorily granted right
to a free public education.' The Court, observing that due process looks not
to the weight of the interest but to its nature,6 declined to view the students'
temporary banishment from school as de minimis.' Any property interest that
is not de minimis, the Court continued, garners due process protection.' The
liberty interest stemmed from the potential impact of the suspensions on the
Academintetgiy, 24J.C. & U.L 97 (1997). Both the student conduct and the academic integrity codes
"are designed to facilitate ethical dialogue in an educational setting, and emphasize clear language,
informal procedures, and procedural fairness. They also incorporate significant student involvement
in the disciplinary process, reflecting the view that the campus community is a contractual association,
committed to participatory governance .... ." Iad at 817.
3 See 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
SSeeiid at 572-73 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972)), SeeTobias v. Univ.
of Tex. at Arlington, 824 S.W.2d 201,208 (Tex. App. 1991). Such an interest presupposes a claim of
entitlement, not a mere abstract need or desire, or unilateral expectation. See id
5 See 419 U.S. at 573 (citingOlo REV. CODE ANN. S 3313.64 (1972)). In his dissentJustice
Powell argued that since the State of Ohio qualified the grant of a free education with a specific
provision for such suspensions, the students had not lost anything beyond the package to which state
law entitled them. See id. at 586-87.
' See itt at 575.
The Court stressed that the nature of an interest, not its wnght, controls whether
constitutional protections under the Fourteenth Amendment apply. See id. at 575 (citing Roth, 408 U.S.
at 570-71).
' See id at 576.
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students' reputation among teachers and other students and on later
educational and employment opportunities.9
Critical to any understanding of the Court's pronouncement,
however, is the simplicity of the hearing required in such cases. Said the
Court: "The fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be
heard."' Accordingly, the Court loosely added, the students were entitled to
"some kind of notice" and "some kind of hearing.""1 Nonetheless, the
requirements of due process are fully met in such cases when the
disciplinarian informs the student, even orally, of the charge and, if the
student denies the charge, provides an explanation of the evidence supporting
it and an opportunity for presentation of the student's version of the
incident. 2 The Court pointed out that these requirements afford, "if
anything, less than a fair-minded school principal would impose upon himself
in order to avoid unfair suspensions."' 3 Adding to the simplicity, the Court
made clear that there need be no delay between notice and hearing. 4
Interestingly, in this disciplinary case the Court emphasized a point thematic
to academic situations-judicial restraint: "Judicial interposition in the
operation of the public school system of the Nation raises problems requiring
care and restraint .... By and large, public education in our Nation is
committed to the control of state and local authorities."' 5
The Court, true to its word, focused on "fundamentally fair
procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred."' 6 Although
the word "hearing" conjures up in the popular mind a complex and lengthy
panoply of procedural devices, it is instructive to focus on what Goss does not
require: the production of the evidence against the student; opportunity for
cross-examination; legal or other representation for the student; transcript;
or appeal. Some of these, though clearly not all, might become
constitutionally requisite in cases threatening more serious consequences, for
example suspensions for more than ten days or expulsions.'
See id at 575.
oId at 579 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
Iot at 579 (emphasis in origiiial).
12 See id at 581.
13 Id at 583.
14 Ste ido at 582. In the usual case, however, notice and hearing should precede any
suspension. See itd
's Id at 578 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,104 (1968)).
16 Id at 574 (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,164 (1974) (emphasis added)).
17 Id at 584.
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Curiously, though one might see excessive corporal punishment as
one official sanction that might trigger still more due process protections than
those outlined in Goss, the Court has exempted physical punishment in
schools from any requirement of notice or a hearing." In Ingraham v. Wnght,"
the Court concluded that the bodily restraint and "appreciable physical pain"
entailed by corporal punishment implicated a liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment.2" Nonetheless, despite a record indicating that
junior-high-school students had suffered "severe" and "exceptionally harsh"
physical beatings,' the Court found that the traditional common law
constraints and remedies provided by the Florida scheme at issue adequately
provided due process.'
To assess what process was due, the Court looked through the prism
constructed in Mathews v. Eldridge.'z Mathews set out three factors for such
inquiries: 1) the nature of the private interest; 2) the risk of error and the
probable value of additional or substitute procedures; and 3) the burden such
procedures would present to the state, both in fiscal and administrative terms.
With regard to the first, the students did have a strong interest in procedural
safeguards to minimize the chance of wrongful punishment and to resolve
disputes concerning justification.24 With regard to the second, the Court
noted that the usual case reflected an insignificant risk of error since the
teacher witnessed the conduct subject to punishment. And, in any event, the
Florida arrangement at issue, especially in the context of the openness of the
school environment, provided substantial protection against wrongfully
imposed corporal punishment." With regard to the third, the Court found
" See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,682 (1977).
19 See 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
o Id at 674. Although the record showed that corporal punishment kept one child out of
school for several days, see id at 657, the Court found no state created property interest at stake:
Corporal punishment is designed to correct without any interruption of the student's education. That
the occasional student might in fact be deprived of some educational time in no way supports the
conclusion that the "practice" of corporal punishment deprives students of property under the Due
Process Clause. Id at 674 n.43.
2I 1dat 657.
2 See id at 683. The Court also held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment applied only to those convicted of crime and not, therefore, to
schoolchildren. Id at 664.
- See 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
24 See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 676.
s See id at 676-78. Under that arrangement, the teacher and principal were required to exercise
prudence and restraint in deciding upon corporal punishment. Moreover, should such punishment
turn out to be excessive, the possibility of civil damages or criminal penalties arose. See id at 676-77.
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that imposing additional significant safeguards would intrude unduly upon
the educational responsibility vested primarily in public-school officials.26
B. The Academic Cases: Horowitz and Ewing
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed academic sanctions in two
separate cases, both involving medical students. In the first, Board ofCurators
of the Universiy of Missouti v. HomwitezJ' the Court let stand a dismissal based
on failure to meet institutional standards. A Council of Evaluation, a group
of faculty members and students charged with assessing academic
performance, recommended that Ms. Horowitz be placed on probation for
her final year. This action followed expressions of dissatisfaction from
several faculty members concerning her clinical performance during a
pediatric rotation. After further unhappiness with her clinical achievement,
the Council concluded that she should not graduate that year and moreover,
absent "radical improvement," should be dropped from the program.
She was allowed, as an "appeal," to undergo oral and practical
examinations under the supervision of seven practicing physicians. Her
results disappointed yet again: Only two of the reviewers recommended
timely graduation; three recommended continued probation; the remaining
two urged immediate dismissal. As a result, the Council reaffirmed its
position. At a subsequent meeting, the Council, noting that she had
generated a "low-satisfactory" rating in a recent surgery rotation, concluded
that, barring reports ofradical improvement, she should not be allowed to re-
enroll. At last, when still another negative report on a rotation appeared, the
Council unanimously recommended that she be dropped from the program.
The coordinating committee, a group of faculty members mandated to review
the actions of the Council, affirmed, as did the dean. The student, who had
not been allowed to appear before either the Council or the coordinating
committee, then appealed to the provost for health services who, after
reviewing the matter, sustained the dismissal.'
Alas, as the dissent pointed out, damages or criminal prosecution took place only after the injury and,
in any event, provided no remedy for errors made in reasonable good faith. Set id at 694-95 (dissenting
opinion).
2' See idi at 680, 682.
Ste 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
21 See itl at 80-82.
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Assuming that she asserted a sufficient constitutional interest29 the
U.S. Supreme Court found no violation of her procedural due process rights.
Indeed, she received more than the "careful and deliberate" assessment to
which she was entitled.3" Her dismissal, the Court said, required no hearing
before the institution's decision making body.3
Despite some unqualified statements that academic cases require no
hearing,32 however, the Court's opinion is not without ambiguity on this
point. At times the Court seems to be saying that Ms. Horowitz did not get,
and was not entitled to, a hearing.33 At other times, the Court seems to be
distinguishing not between having and not having a hearing, but between a
formal hearing and an informal one,34 thus suggesting that she received the
latter. Conceivably, the Court meant that she received an informal hearing,
but was not entitled to one, thus making the latter statement a dictum.3
" Ms. Horowitz had argued only a liberty interest, based upon the likely diminution of her
educational or employment opportunities in the medical field. Set id at 82.
SId at 85.
SSee id at 86 n.3.
'- "[C]onsidering all relevant factors .. a hearing is not required by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id "[We decline to ... formalize the academic dismissal process
by requiring a hearing." I at 90.
13 After noting that Goss required a hearing, though only an "informal give-and-take," the
Court distinguished the disciplinary, involved in Goss, from the academic, involved in Homifk. Id at
85. The Court concluded that the latter called for "far less stringent procedures," thus suggesting that
Ms. Horowitz was not entitled even to an informal hearing. Id at 85. But why say all this if the Court
felt she had gotten such a hearing?
I "The Court of Appeals apparently read Goxs as requiring some type of formal hearing at
which respondent could defend her academic ability and performance. All that Goss required was an
'informal give-and-take' between the student and the administrative body dismissing him that would,
at least, give the student 'the opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the
proper context."' Id at 85-86 (quoting Goss, 419 U.S. at 584) (emphasis added). "These prior decisions
of state and federal courts... unanimously holding thatformalhearings before decision making bodies
need not be held in the case of academic dismissals, cannot be rejected lightly." Id at 88. "Even in
the context of a school disciplinary proceeding, however, the Court stopped short of requiring aformal
hearing.. . ." Id at 89 (emphasis added). "Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast to
disciplinary determinations, bear little resemblance to the judicial and administrative fact finding
proceedings to which we have traditionally attached afull-heafing requirement." Id at 89 (emphasis
added).
' The Court agreed with the district court that, in providing Ms. Horowitz the chance to be
assessed by seven independent physicians, the institution afforded her more procedural due process
than constitutionally required. See id at 85. Justice Marshall, in his separate opinion in Horomit% stated:
These-meetings and letters plainly gave respondent all that Goss requires: several notices
and explanations, and at least three opportunities 'to present her side of the story.' I do
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Nonetheless, other courts have dearly read Horowitz to exempt academic
matters from any requirement of a"hearing"36-however that term might be
understood.
Recognizing the precedential thrust of Goss, the Court labored to
distinguish Ms. Horowitz's case as academic, rather than disciplinary; an
academic case, the Court stressed, "calls for far less stringent procedural
requirements .... ""7 Many of the Court's observations on the reduced need
for procedure in academic cases seem conclusory.3' For example, the Court
asserts that Goss, dealing as it did with allegations of disruptive
demonstrations, an attack on a police officer and vandalism, involved "factual
conclusions." '39 But deafly Homwitz- too involved factual conclusions: the
student's performance in a variety of contexts and, ultimately, her fitness for
the practice of medicine. At another point the Court says, "A school is an
academic institution, not a courtroom or administrative hearing room."' But
of course this obvious point applies as well to disciplinary matters.
At bottom, three rationales seemed to underlie the Court's efforts to
distance Homwit from Gosi. 1) the flexibility needed by educational
institutions to deal with a panoply of situations;4' 2) the supposed greater
subjectivity involved in "academic" decisions, a subjectivity not given to
not read the Courts opinion to disagree with this conclusion. Hence I do not
understand why the Court indicates that even the 'informal give-and-take' mandated by
Goss need not have been provided here. See id. at 99 (concurring and dissenting opinion)
(citations omitted).
Justice Marshall refers to the Court's d'ta "suggesting that respondent was entitled to even less
procedural protection than she received," and "to the effect that even the minimum procedures
required in Goss need not have been provided to respondent." See id at 97, 99.
See text accompanying note 300.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 86.
3' The Court referred to the "distinct differences between decisions to suspend or dismiss.
for disciplinary purposes and similar actions taken for academic reasons which may call for hearings
in connection with the former but not the latter." Id at 87. "Academic evaluations of a student, in
contrast to disciplinary determinations, bear little resemblance to the judicial and administrative fact
finding proceedings to which we have traditionally attached a full-hearing requirement." Id at 89.
" Id at 89.
0 Id at 88.
4 "The need for flexibility is well illustrated by the significant difference between the failure
of a student to meet academic standards and the violation by a student of valid rules of conduct." Id
at 86.
Dutfil2001]
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effective judicial review;' and 3) the decreased adversariness typifying the
teacher-student relationship in "academic" matters.43
Although the issue had not been addressed by the Court of Appeals, 4
4
the Court ruled that the student's substantive due process rights, even if
applicable to this context, had not been violated; the conduct of the
institution was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Here too the "academic"
nature of the matter proved persuasive: "Courts are particularly ill-equipped
to evaluate academic performance. The factors discussed... with respect to
procedural due process speak afotiorihere and warn against any such judicial
intrusion into academic decision making."'4
The Court made judicial attacks on "academic" decisions still more
difficult in the second of the two cases, Regents of the Univerity ofMichigan v.
Ewing.4  Mr. Ewing found himself dismissed from Inteflex, a six-year
program that allowed students to garner both an undergraduate and a medical
degree in six years. In order to qualify for the final two years, students were
required to take the NBME-Part I examination. On this examination, he
earned the lowest score in the program's brief history. Denied readmission
and the opportunity to re-take the test, he sued, alleging a violation of
substantive due process4 Part of his case relied on the assertion that others
had routinely been allowed to re-take the NMBE.' Echoing its thoughts in
Homwit.6 the Court declined to decide whether Ewing's interest in continued
enrollment in the Program constituted a property right entitled to substantive
'2 Id at 90 (holding that "academic" decisions are "more subjective and evaluative," and "not
readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decision making."). See also Van
de Zilver v. Rutgers Univ., 971 F. Supp. 925, 931 (D.N.J. 1997). "In Goss, this Court felt that
suspensions of students for disciplinary reasons have a sufficient resemblance to traditional judicial and
administrative fact finding to call for a 'hearing' before the relevant school authority." Hotrowi 435
U.S. at 88-89.
43 "Influencing this conclusion [in Gos4j was dearly the belief that disciplinary proceedings.
may automatically bring an adversary flavor to the normal student-teacher relationship. The same
conclusion does not follow in the academic context." Horewit 435 U.S. at 90.
44 See id at 107 (MarshallJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
4s Id at 92.
4' 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
SSee id at 215-17. He also alleged that state law claims are irrelevant here. Seeid at 217.
48 See ia Indeed, of thirty-nine students, in both the Inteflex and the standard programs, who
had failed the exam, all but Ewing were allowed to re-sit for the exam, many more than once. See id
at 219. The Court rejoined that nineteen Inteflex students had been dismissed without any opportunity
to take the exam. These data, said the Court, demonstrate the "insusceptibility ofpromotion decisions
... to rigorous judicial review." Id at 228 n.14.
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protection under the Fourteenth Amendment But assuming such a right, the
Court unanimously held that it had not been violated. The institution's action
was not arbitrary, but rather had been taken conscientiously and with careful
deliberation.49 The decision makers had considered his entire record,
including his "singularly low score" on the NMBE.s°
Emphasizing a "narrow avenue" for judicial review of the substance
of "academic" decisions,s" the Court made dear that federal judges should
eschew second-guessing the decision makers in such cases:
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic
decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for the faculty's
professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a
substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that
the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional
judgment' s2
Two factors add special interest to the Court's approach in ERing. First, the
Court seemed very mindful that greater willingness to take on such cases could
inundate the Court with matters brought to it from America's educational arena. The
judiciary, the Court noted, is ill-suited to "evaluate the substance of the multitude of
academic decisions that are made daiy by faculty members of public educational
institutions."5
3
Second, and related, the Court stressed its concern for the academic
freedom of such institutions. Said the Court: 'Discretion to determine, on academic
grounds, who may be admitted to study, has been described as one of 'the four
essential freedoms' of a university." Whether a student like Mr. Ewing remained
at the medical school thus implicated that institution's academic freedom, a concept
' All nine members of the promotion and review board voted to dismiss him. At his request,
the board reconvened, but reached the same result. The executive committee of the medical school,
after providing him an opportunity to appear before it, unanimously denied his appeal for a retake.
The following year, and to no avail, he twice appeared before the executive committee. See it at 216-
17.
s It at 225 and 228. Aside from his dismal performance on the NMBE, Ewing's record
revealed marginal grades, seven incompletes, and a number of make-up exams, some occurring even
as he carried a reduced course load. See ido at 218-19.
sId at 227.
SSee ho at 225 (citations omitted).
I dot at 226 (emphasis added).
s' Id at 226 n.12 (citing Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.) (quoting Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result)
(internal quotations omitted)).
2001] Dutile
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of "special concern" to the First Amendment,55 and gave the institution a
constitutional interest to pit against the student's. Ironically perhaps, in Bwing, the
institution's constitutional interest trumped the student's.
III. THE INTERESTS PROTECTED
Students adversely affected by university decisions have invoked both
procedural and substantive due process. With regard to procedural due process,
"little theoretical complaint exists about a court's active role in reviewing the fairness
of a governmental decision-making process as the judiciary seems uniquely suited for
such a task." 6 Substantive challenges, which "strike at the decision itself and not at
the procedures afforded,"' call forth more controversy since, after all, the Due
Process Clause itself targets process. Justice White has observed that "[a]lthough the
Court regularly proceeds on the assumption that the Due Process Clause has more
than a procedural dimension, we must always bear in mind that the substantive
content of the Clause is suggested neither by its language nor by preconstitutional
history.. . ."5' Professor Tribe has alluded to the "textual gymnastics arguably
necessary to find protection of substantive rights in a provision whose words seem
most apparently concerned with process." 9 Nonetheless, the words "of law" do
follow the phrase "due process"' and, in any event, the notion of substantive due
process serves a practical purpose in light of the prevailing assumption that some
actions transcend "any proper sphere of governmental activity."" Despite the
occasional suggestion that substantive due process is an oxymoron,62 substantive due
process remains the principal device for enforcing individual rights against state
encroachment. Furthermore, within this arena, the Court's ability to assess the
s Id at 226.
' JOHN B. NOWAK& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 346 (5th ed. 1995). See
general§ William G. Buss, Eay Cases Make BadLaw: AcademicExp u/sion and the Uncertain Law of Prcedural
Due Preoss, 65 IOWA L REV. 1 (1979).
s Brown v. Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr. at Tyler, 957 S.W.2d 911,916 (1997).
s Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,543 (1977) (dissenting opinion).
s' LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmERICAN CONSTITrrTIONAL LAW, Vol. 1, 1317 (3d ed. 2000). See
also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, s1fra note 56, at 347 ("Although the effect of a substantive due process
decision is readily apparent, the basis on which a court justifiably can reach such a decision has been
a source of continuing controversy.").
I TRIBE, sypra note 59, at 1333.
61 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 56, at 347. With regard to practicality, Professor Black
called substantive due process "an invention that now and then works a little bit in practice, but does
notworkintellectually." CHARLESL.BLACKJR.,ANEwBIRTHoFFREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTNAMED
AND UNNAMED 105-06 (1997), quotedin TRIBE, sara note 59, at 1317.
62 SeeJOHN HARTELY, DEMOCRACY'AND DISTRUST 18 (1980), quotedin TRIBE, supra note 59,
at 1333.
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constitutionality of federal and state legislative and executive action draws greater
criticism than does substantive review under specific provisions of, or amendments
to, the Constitution. 3
In any event, the language of the Clause makes clear that claims under either
procedural or substantive due process require that life, liberty or property be at
stake." Clearly, not all interests a citizen might claim fall under these rubrics and,
despite a "virtually all-encompassing" interpretation in earlier cases, "[t]oday these
concepts are being defined so as to exclude a variety of personal interests from their
scope and protection.... .65
The Supreme Court made dear in Goss that a student attending public
school under state entitlement enjoys both a property interest and a liberty interest
justifying procedural protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." The Court made clear in Ingraham that a public-school student facing
the bodily restraint and pain of corporal punishment enjoys a liberty interest but,
since no loss of school time usually depends on the matter, no property right is at
stake. Neither of these cases, of course, provides sure guidance with regard to
property or liberty interests in higher education. The nature of the relationship
between the student and the college or university differs markedly from that between
a K-12 student and the public school, including with regard to the nature of any state
guarantee of an education.
Both Hormwtz and Fuing, to be sure, did involve higher education. But in
Horowit,, in which the student argued only a liberty interest, the Court avoided the
issue by assuming she had a constitutionally protectible interest.68 With regard to the
63 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 56, at 347.
.See itd See Wheeler v. Miller, 168 F.3d 241, 249 (5th Cir. 1999); Van de Zilver v. Rutgers
Univ., 971 F. Supp. 925, 931 (D.N.J. 1997); Lewin v. Med. Coll. of Hampton Roads, 910 F. Supp.
1161, 1164 (E.D. Va. 1996); Siblerud v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 896 F. Supp. 1506, 1512 (D. Colo.
1995) (dictum); Lucas v. Hahn, 648 A.2d 839,841 (Vt. 1994); Nickerson v. Univ. of Alaska Anchorage,
975 P.2d 46, 52 (Alaska 1999); Tobias v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 824 S.W.2d 201,208 (rex. Ct.
App. 1991). ButseeTobin v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 59 F. Supp. 2d 87,89 (D. Me. 1999) (stating in ditum
that one could prevail on a substantive due process claim by showing state action that 'shocks the
conscience,' regardless of the existence of a liberty or property interest').
6s NoWAK & ROTUNDA, s.pra note 56, at 347. "The distinction is now between life,
recognized liberty interests and property 'entitlements' as opposed to unprotected interests or 'mere
expectations."' Id
,See text accompanying notes 4 and 5.
67 See note 20 and text accompanying note 20.
.See text accompanying note 29.
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still trickier notion of a sufficient interest under substantive due process, the Court,
in both Horowitz and Ening merely assumed such an interest in deciding that, in any
event, the students' rights had not been violated.69 In the context of college and
university disputes, therefore, other courts have been left to speculate with regard
to the nature and extent of protectible interests under the Due Process Clause. Not
surprisingly, the results have been mixed and unpredictable.
A. Property Interests
Property interests under the Fourteenth Amendment presume more than
an expectancy, an abstract need, or a desire; there must be a claim of entitlement.7"
Such interests arise not from the Constitution itself but rather from an independent
source such as state law.7 In the context of higher education, the threatened loss of
an already-awarded degree presents the best case for procedural protection as
"property" under the Due Process Clause.72  Dismissals and similar adverse
determinations, whether academic or disciplinary, also would seem to present strong
cases for such protection. 3 Even here, however, certainty proves elusive: "Courts
are split on the question whether a graduate level student has a constitutionally
protected interest in completing his education."'74 Still, in Harris v. Blake,"5 the Tenth
Circuit referred to the graduate student's "property interest in continued
69 See text accompanying note 45.
o See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,601
(1972); Van de Zilver v. Rutgers Univ., 971 F. Supp. 925, 931 (D. N.J. 1997);Jenkins v. Hutton, 967
F. Supp. 277, 281 (S.D. Ohio 1997). Seegeneral4 Tonya Robinson, P"pty Interests and Due Proess in
Pubic Unintrsio and Communi_* Colkge Student Disciplinary Proceedings, 30 ScH. L BuLt. 10 (1999).
71 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577;Jenkih, 967 F. Supp. at 281; Qvyjt v. Lin, 932 F. Supp. 1100,1108
(N.D. 111. 1997); Siblerud v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 896 F. Supp. 1506,1512 (D. Colo. 1995) (tdAu).
In _Oet, the court found that Illinois law gave the student a contractual right to a degree. It went on
to hold, however, that any random and unauthorized conduct by state actors in this case did not violate
due process because Illinois law provided a post-deprivation remedy. See 932 F. Supp. at 1108.
' Crook v. Baker, 813 F.2d 88,97-99 (6th Cir. 1937); Waliga v. Bd. of Trustees of Kent State
Univ., 488 N.E.2d 850, 853 (Ohio 1986).
' See Sibemd, 896 F. Supp. at 1512,1516 (holding dismissal threatens an "exceptionally robust"
property interest (ditum)); Adibi-Sadeh v. Bee County Coll., 454 F. Supp. 552, 557 (S.D. Tex. 1978);
Gagne v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 692 N.E.2d 489, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (stating student facing
expulsion has property interest in pursuing education); Reilly v. Daly, 666 N.E.2d 439,444 (nd. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding suspension or expulsion threatens student's property interest in pursuing
education); Smith v. Denton, 895 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Ark. 1995); Knapp v. Jr. Coll. Dist. of St Louis
County, Mo., 879 S.W.2d 588,592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Henderson State Univ. v. Spadoni, 848 S.W.2d
951,953 (Ark. Ct App. 1993).
' Jenkins, 967 F. Supp. at 282-
75 See 798 F.2d 419 (10th Cir. 1986).
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enrollment."7' In Herbert v. Reinstein,' a federal district court clothed a suspended
law student with such an interest "Once a state undertakes to provide educational
services, students attending the school acquire a constitutionally protected property
interest in obtaining an education."78 The Ninth Circuit has deemed a medical
residency a property interest worthy of constitutional protection.79 Indeed, even
academic credits, since they constitute the building blocks of academic degrees, may
themselves be property under the Fourteenth Amendment' °
A few courts have been willing to find protected interests elsewhere. In
Evans v. West Virginia Board of Regents,"' a former student applied for readmission a
mere two months following the expiration of the leave of absence he had taken after
two-and-a-half years of study. The court found a property interest in the completion
of his medical education sufficient to justify imposition of "minimal" due process
protection on the review of his application by the Board of Regents.82 In 1991 the
Second Circuit invested a student with the right to good-faith dealing by looking to
New York's recognition of an implied contract between students and their college
or university: "Such an implied contract, recognized under state law, provides the
basis for a property interest that would be entitled to constitutional protection."83
Similarly, in Ikpea7u v. University of Nebraska,' the Eighth Circuit indicated its
openness to bringing fair grading within the category of interests protected under the
procedural mantle of the Due Process Clause: Here, the University of Nebraska
promulgated a publication setting forth a grievance procedure for student appeals
of allegedly capricious or improper grades. This procedure does appear to imply a
contractual expectationin students that they will not be graded capriciously, and thus
"' Id at 423 (noting student's tuition payment cemented the entitlement). Accord Gorman v.
Univ. of RLI., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988); Stoller v. Coll. of Med., 562 F. Supp. 403,412 (M.D. Pa.
1983); Hart v. Ferris State Coll., 557 F. Supp. 1379,1382 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Shuman v. Univ. of Minn.
Law Sch., 451 N.W.2d 71,74 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Univ. of Houston v. Sabeti, 676 S.W.2d 685,687-
88 (Tex. App. 1984) (citing Goss, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1967)).
n See No. 94-5765, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15234 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20,1994).
71 Id at *8. AccordFoo v. Ala. Univ., 88 F. Supp. 2d 937,947 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (holding threat
of expulsion or suspension enough to trigger protections under Fourteenth Amendment); Ross v. Pa.
State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
'9 See Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976).
80 See Merrow v. Goldberg, 672 F. Supp. 766,771 (D. Vt. 1987) ("It seems dear... that public
college and university graduates have protected property interests in their degrees. Since degrees are
awarded as the result of accumulated credits, the parties agree that credits should be entitled to
protection similar to that afforded degrees.").
s 271 S.E.2d 778 (W. Va. 1980).
' Id at 782.
1 Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698,705 (2d Cir. 1991).
u 775 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1985).
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to create a cognizable property right in nonarbitrary grading. That the publication
only sets forth a procedure for appealing a grade, and not an express promise that
grading shall not be arbitrary, arguably should not alter our conclusion."5
One court brought a student's good standing under the umbrella of the Due
Process Clause, though deeming it immaterial whether that interest be labeled
"property" or "liberty.' s' In 1991, in E.ekwo v. ANYCHealth e_"HospitalsAsmn,87 the
Second Circuit confirmed an ophthalmology resident's property interest in the
position of "ChiefResident, a prestigious position normallyrotated among third-year
residents on an alphabetical basis."88 In doing so, however, the court assessed the
interest largely from the perspective of an employee-as opposed to a student."9 An
athletic scholarship, granted underpromises ofrenewal upon satisfaction of specified
conditions, also engenders the type of entitlement protected by due process."
Despite such pronouncements, courts have often rejected assertions of
property interests in the higher education context. In some courts, even the interest
in continued enrollment has failed to garner constitutional protection. 1 Still more
easily, obviously, can courts resist constitutional protection in connection with
Ia at 253.
Picozzi v. Sandalow, 623 F. Supp. 1571,1576 n.4 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
940 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1991).
See id at 782, 783. Two weeks before her scheduled time to serve as chief resident, her
professors, apparently irked by her complaints, met to discuss her assumption of the position. That
very day came the decision to supplant the rotational system with a merit-based system. See id. at 778-
79.
" See id. at 782-83. The court's conclusion occasioned a vigorous disagreement "The majority
points to no court which has yet held that such an interest rises to the level of a protectible property
interest." Id at 789 (concurring and dissenting opinion). Quoting the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,349 (1976), that federal courts cannot review 'the
multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies,"' Judge Timbers argued that
employment results short of termination implicate no property rights. Idi Recognizing the academic
aspect of the case, he stressed that finding property rights in every change in academic policy would
instill timidity in administrators of educational institutions. Id.
o See Conard v. Washington, 814 P.2d 1242,1246 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
91 See Fernandez v. Rosenzweig, No. 95-241-FR, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11509, at *9 (D. Or.
Aug. 8,1996) ("There is no case holding that a student has a federally-protected due process, property
or liberty interest in continued enrollment in or graduation from a state university. This court will not
so hold."); Phillipeaux v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., No. 93CIV4438(SAS), 1996 WL 164462 (S.D.N.Y.
April 9,1996), aff'd by 104 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 1996). See Soong v. Univ. of Haw., 825 P.2d 1060 (Haw.
1992).
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probation, 2 a "suspended suspension"" or one's interest in a particular program
within the institution.' Although a student accepted for admission may, prior to
matriculation, carry a "slight" property interest,95 possible admission into the
institution, at least for graduate or professional education, presents a mere
expectancy not entitled to constitutional protection.96 In Tobin v. Univeriy ofMaine,97
the plaintiff, a law-school applicant, sought to avoid this problem by framing his
benefit as an entitlement to professional education at reduced tuition, available to
him as a Maine resident. The court would have none of it
I]he reduced tuition rates are a benefit enjoyed by in-state residents who
have been deemed qualiedfor admission and have been so admitted Indeed, several
courts have recognized that reduced tuition rates for in-state residents give
rise to a property right, but each did so in the context of matriculated
students who wished to change their status from nonresident to resident for
tuition purposes. 
9
' See Szejner v. Univ. of Alaska, 944 P.2d 481, 486-87 (Alaska 1997) (recognizing, in such
cases, therefore, not even minimal procedures required).
"' Beaver v. Ortenzi, 524 A.2d 1022,1024 (Pa. Commw. Ct 1987) (framing the issue in terms
of standing).
' See Paoli v. Univ. of Del., 695 F. Supp. 171, 173 (D. Del. 1988). See Hennessy v. City of
Melrose, 194 F.3d 237, 249-50 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that a claim to a constitutionally protected
property right "especially tenuous because Salem State did not expel the appellant, but merely
precluded him from continuing in a particular program."). In "an abundance of caution," however,
the court assumed such an interest on its way to denying relief. Id
s Martin v. Helstad, 578 F. Supp. 1473, 1482 (W.D. Wis. 1983).
See Tobin v. Univ. of Me., 59 F. Supp. 2d 87,90 (D. Me. 1999); S~ejner, 944 P.2d at 486. Bmt
see Hall v. Univ. of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982). In Hall, the plaintiff, an athlete who
aspired to play professionally, was denied admission to a baccalaureate program in the University after
completing a non-baccalaureate program. His grades were good and no similarly situated student had
been rejected. The court noted that, because the plaintiff had lost a scholarship for a year, the case
smacked more of an expulsion case than a non-admission case; accordingly, the plaintiff had a
constitutionally protected property interest. See id at 107-08. Once an application for admission has
been accepted, however, revocation of that acceptance might implicate a property interest. SeeMa-tin,
699 F.2d at 389.
9 59 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
V Id at 91 (emphasis in original).
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Interests in readmission have met the same fate.99 Rejected as well have
been assertions of constitutionally protected interests concerning grades.'0 0 Not
surprisingly, one's interest in a proposed theme for an oral examination does not rise
to a constitutionally protected level."0 ' Imposition upon a student, as the result of
a disciplinary proceeding, of a contract whose violation could yield expulsion is not
itself an expulsion for these purposes. 2 A graduate student also employed to teach
at the university has no property interest in a particular course assignment, at least
absent some contractual or other guarantee. 3 Although student-athletes may have
a property interest in the scholarship funds promised in their agreement with the
college or university, they hold no property interest in actually participating in
athletics at the institution-at least unless the agreement so specifies. 104 Finally,
courts have disagreed regarding whether the failure of an institution to adhere to its
own rules implicates a constitutionally protected interest.'
" See Anderson v. Univ. of Wis., 665 F. Supp. 1372, 1396 (W.D. Wis. 1987). The court in
Wallerv. Southern Illinois University, 125 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 1997), strongly doubted that one's interest
in being considered for readmission warranted protection under the Due Process Clause, but assumed
as much in deciding that in any event the student's rights were not violated. Of course, once the
student is granted admission or readmission, a public institution violating the resulting contract might
well transgress upon a constitutionally protected interest See id at 541.
"~o See Redman v. Mich. State Univ., No. G85-1073-CA5,1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15619 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 24, 1987) (holding that a student who twice failed exam but nonetheless remained in the
program was not denied property interest).
101 See Ndefru v. Sherwood, No. 93-4127-SAC, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18621 (D. Kan. Dec.
29, 1993). In Lightsey v. King, 567 F. Supp. 645 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), the court declined to decide
whether the student, who had been acquitted of an honor code violation, had a property interest at
stake when the institution nonetheless refused to change his grade of "zero" in the course, as the
result of which he could not take a promotional examination. The court did conclude he had a liberty
interest. See id at 648.
'o See Foo v. Ind. Univ., 88 F. Supp. 2d 937, 950 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
103 See Kelleher v. Flawn, 761 F.2d 1079,1087 (5th Cir. 1985); acardNaragon v. Wharton, 572
F. Supp. 1117,1123 (M.D. La. 1983).
1"4 See Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D. Kan. 1987). See also
Fluitt v. Univ. of Neb., 489 F. Supp. 1194,1203 (D. Neb. 1980) (noting there is no property interest
in college athletics absent scholarship or notification of one).
" Compare Skehan v. Bd. of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 38-39 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding the right to
have published procedures applied has been deemed a property interest that must be honored) with
Bergstrom v. Buettner, 697 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 (D.N.D. 1987) (holding that medical school's
regulation stating that written grading criteria would issue on the first day of a rotation did not rise to
level of constitutionally protected interest). Cf. Carboni v. Meldrum, 949 F. Supp. 427,437 (W.D. Va.
1996) ("At best, Plaintiff's claims lead to a conclusion that defendants may have violated her
procedural rights as guaranteed by state law. Such violations do not give rise to federal constitutional
concern.').
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B. Liberty Interests
A strong case for asserting a liberty interest arises in connection with an
expulsion.0 6 In Donohue v. Baker,'°7 for example, the federal district court observed:
"It is well settled that an expulsion from college is a stigmatizing event which
implicates a student's protected liberty interest."' O'l To be sure, in Donohue the
institution expelled the plaintiff following his conviction for rape, but the court did
not condition its statement on that specific. So too, in Nickerson v. University of.A/aska
Anchorage,1"a state court deemed sufficiently stigmatizing to trigger a liberty interest
the student's dismissal from a graduate program for hostile, intimidating and
unprofessional conduct."' Suspension too raises a liberty interest."' In Thomas v.
Gee,"2 the Southern District of Ohio concluded that the freedom to pursue one's
education free from governmental racial discrimination did constitute a liberty
interest within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment."' Since a liberty
interest does arise whenever "a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity
is at stake because of what the government is doing to him," a student charged with
cheating may rightfully claim such an interest."' A Michigan federal court held that
one's interest in continued good standing at the institution also creates a
constitutionally protected interest, but refused to characterize that interest more
specifically as either "property" or 'liberty."2
5
" See Reilly v. Daly, 666 N.E.2d 439, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that an expulsion
threatens student's liberty interest in pursuing education); ef Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v.
Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995) (applying Texas parallel to Due Process Clause).
'~' 976 F. Supp. 136 (D.N.Y. 1997).
'0 Id at 145; accord Gorman v. Univ. of RI., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding that
expulsion or suspension is protected); Hart v. Ferris State Coll., 557 F. Supp. 1379,1382 (W.D. Mich.
1983) (holding suspension or expulsion protected); Gagne v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 692 N.E.2d 489,
493 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Univ. of Houston v. Sabeti, 676 S.W.2d 685,687-88 (Tex. App. 1984) (citing
Goss). See also Thomas v. Gee, 850 F. Supp. 665, 676 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (stating that student's only
liberty interest in continued enrollment was right not to be discriminated against because of her race).
109 75 P.2d 46 (Alaska 1999).
110 See id at 52.
... See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 12; Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1247
(E.D. Mich. 1984); Hart, 557 F. Supp. at 1382; Rdi45, 666 N.E.2d at 444 (holding suspension threatens
student's liberty interest in pursuing education).
2 850 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
SSee id at 676.
... See Lightsey v. King, 567 F. Supp. 645, 648 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
"' Picozzi v. Sandalow, 623 F. Supp. 1571,1576 n.4 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
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Other judicial pronouncements have been less generous in finding a liberty
interest in continued enrollment or in graduation." 6 In 1976, for example, the Ninth
Circuit refused to find a liberty interest at stake in the termination of a resident
physician in pathology due to charges of an inability to perform satisfactorily."' A
fortiori, one threatened with probation has no liberty interest at stake; some
interruption of the student's education must be in play.' The Second Circuit found
no liberty interest implicated when faculty members entered allegedly false,
misleading, and stigmatizing "anecdotal records" that did not constitute part of the
official record; the student would have to show dissemination to the public."' In any
event, defamation alone, unaccompanied by a change in student status or damage to
reputation caused by publicizing the defamation, does not rise (or lower) to the level
of stigma.
120
Applications for admission create no liberty interest. In Tobin, 2 a sixty-five-
year-old applicant was denied admission to law school. Said the court.
Plaintiff's allegations do not implicate a liberty interest... He does not
allege that any conduct on the part of the Law School affected any other
applications he may have submitted, or intends to submit, to other law
schools. Furthermore, he does not allege that he is foreclosed from
pursuing a legal education and career.12
Of course, one has no liberty interest involved in the rejection of a proposed
theme for an oral examination."' The mere non-renewal of a graduate student's
teaching appointment, unaccompanied by any stigma resulting from charges
1,6 See Fernandez v. Rosenzwieg, No. 95-241-FR, 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11509, at *9 (D. Or.
Aug. 8, 1996); Thomas, 850 F. Supp. at 675 (stating that education is not a fundamental right implicitly
protected by Constitution).
1.7 See Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976). Plaintiff did have
a property interest See text accompanying note 79.
"s See Szejner v. Univ. of Alaska, 944 P.2d 481,486-87 (Alaska 1997).
119 Clements v. Nassau County, 835 F.2d 1000, 1006 (2d Cir. 1987).
See Wheeler v. Miller, 168 F.3d 241,250-51 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 695, 702 (1976)). See Alanis v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 843 S.W.2d 779, 787 ('ex. App.
1992) (holding that information made public must impose stigma or other disability foreclosing other
employment opportunities).
121 59 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D. Me. 1999) (memorandum opinion).
122 Ia at 93. Accord Sd nr, 944 P.2d at 486 (holding no liberty interest in admission absent
underlying charges or publicizing reasons for denial of admission).
12" See Ndefru v. Sherwood, No. 93-4127-SAC, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18621 (D. Kan. Dec.
29, 1993).
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publicized by the employer, implicates no liberty interest"4 Nor does one have such
an interest in pursuing a career in college football12s
Many courts at all levels, however, have avoided deciding the crucial issue
of when an adverse academic or disciplinary decision on the part of university
officials implicates a property or liberty interest In both Homwitk and Ewing the
Supreme Court itself, whose principal role it is to guide lower courts through the
thickets of constitutional law, assumed without deciding that the plaintiffs asserted
a sufficient interest to justify a judicial assessment of the decisional processes of the
educational institutions involved. This failure of guidance, on a clearly threshold
issue, may well have spawned, or at least lengthened, litigation against universities
and others. Predictably, lower courts themselves, taking their cues (or more precisely
their lack thereof) from the Supreme Court,126 have often assumed the interest and
gone on to review the decision-making process." Several federal courts of appeals
have assumed arguendo that a public-university student facing dismissal properly
asserts a protectible interest"a Other courts have assumed that students have such
interests in graduating,'" in continuing their education,"' in remaining in a particular
program within the university,1"' in becoming enrolled once accepted for
24 SeeKelleher v. Flawn, 761 F.2d 1079,1087 (5th Cir. 1985); AccordNaragon v. Wharton, 572
F. Supp. 1117, 1123 (M.D. La. 1983).
'~ See Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940,945 (D. Kan. 1987).
, See Hennessy v. City of Melrose, 194 F.3d 237, 249 (1st Cir. 1999) ('The Supreme Court has
not yet decided whether a student at a state university has a constitutionally protected property interest
in continued enrollment."); Megenity v. Stenger, 27 F.3d 1120,1125 (6th Cir. 1994) ('We see no need
. .. to rush in where the Supreme Court feared to tread in Enmg.'); Mauriello v. Univ. of Med. and
Dentistry of N.J., 781 F.2d 46,52 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[Flollowing the lead of the Supreme Court, we will
assume arguendo that a constitutional right is implicated.'); Schuler v. Univ. of Minn., 788 F.2d 510,515
(8th Cir. 1986) ("HoroitZ left open the question of whether a university student subject to academic
dismissal may maintain a cause of action for the violation of his or her right to substantive due
process."). See also Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69,73 (4th Cir. 1983).
".' See, e.g., Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn. at Memphis, 159 F.3d 199, 207 (6th Cir. 1998); Davis
v. Mann, 882 F.2d 967,973 (5th Cir. 1989);Jenkins v. Hutton, 967 F. Supp. 277,283 (S.D. Ohio 1997);
Thomas v. Gee, 850 F. Supp. 665, 674 (S.D. Ohio 1994); Lucas v. Hahn, 648 A.2d 839, 841-42 (Vt.
1994); Dillingham v. Univ. of Colo., Bd. of Regents, 790 P.2d 851,854 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Ross v.
Univ. of Minn., 439 N.W.2d 28,34 (Minn. Ct App. 1989).
1 See Disesa v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., 79 F.3d 92,95 (8th Cir. 1996); Megeni-, 27 F.3d at 1124;
Schuer, 788 F.2d at 513 n.6; Mamiello, 781 F.2d at 47; Hines v. Rinker, 667 F.2d 699, 703 (8th Cir.
1981).
£29 SeeQvyjtv. Lin, 932 F. Supp. 1100,1106 (N.D. MI. 1996); Alexanderv. Kennedy-King Coll.,
No. 88 C 2117, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14997 (N.D. Ill. November 2,1990). J
" See Jenki s, 967 F. Supp. at 282; Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Auth., 852 F. Supp.
1512, 1537 (M.D. Ala. 1994); Wilkenfield v. Powell, 577 F. Supp. 579,583-84 (D. Tex. 1983).
". See Henme.rxy, 194 F.3d at 250; Van de Zilver v. Rutgers Univ., 971 F. Supp. 925,932 (D.N.J.
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admission,'32 in receiving passing grades and access to transcripts,' and even in
being considered for readmission."M To be sure, such assumptions get voiced in
varying degrees of skepticism, with courts sometimes intimating how they might rule,
if pressed, on the issue of protectible interests.3 5 Finally, although the point has not
been stressed in the cases, the student claiming a liberty interest may have to prove
more than the stigma or other disability foreclosing educational or employment
opportunities; a showing that the student had no opportunity to clear her name
before the appropriate decision maker may be required.'36
C. Interests under substantive due process
Does substantive due process perchance require a different, or narrower,
kind of underlying interest than those qualifying for protection under procedural due
process? In Ewing, Justice Powell argued in his concurrence that the "property"
sufficient for review procedurally under the clause would not do for substantive
review: "While property interests are protected by procedural due process even
though the interest is derived from state law rather than the Constitution, substantive
due process rights are created only by the Constitution."' Ewing's interest in
continued enrollment, Justice Powell continued, "bears little resemblance to the
fundamental interests that previously have been viewed as implicitly protected by the
Constitution."'3 Consistent with this view, a federal district court rejected the
1997).
132 See Martin v. Helstad, 699 F.2d 387,389-90 (7th Cir. 1983).
"'3 See Perez v. Univ. of Charleston, No. 99-1745,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29463 (4th Cir. Nov.
9, 1999) (per curiam) (memorandum).
13 SeeWaller v. S. Ill. Univ., 125 F.3d 541,542 (7th Cir. 1997).
5 See, e.g., Hemney,194 F.3d at 249-50 ("Mhe claim to such a property interest is dubious..
• and in this case it seems especially tenuous.... In an abundance of caution, however, we assume for
argument's sake [such an interest] ... ."); see Waler, 125 F.3d at 542 ("The contractual right claimed
here, however, is not a right to admission or readmission; it is merely a right to be conddernd for
readmission; and it may be doubted whether that right has sufficient value or definiteness to come
within the concept of constitutional property. But... we shall assume for the sake of argument that
even so nebulous and etiolated an 'entidement' can be thought of as property."); Mauriello v. Univ.
of Med. and Dentistry of N.J., 781 F.2d 46, 52 (3d Cir. 1986) ("We share Justice Powell's doubt
[expressed in his EBing concurrence] about the existence of such a substantive due process right in the
circumstances here.... ".
n SeeAlanis v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 843 S.W.2d 779,787 (F'ex. App. 1992).
'z Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985) (concurring opinion)
(citation omitted). In Jenkins v. Hutton, 967 F. Supp. 277 (S.D. Ohio 1997), the court noted that
substantive due process protects specific, fundamental rights of individual freedom and liberty. These
rights, the court added, stem from the Constitution itself and are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." Id. at 282 (citing Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1328 (6th Cir. 1988)).
in 474 U.S. at 229-30.
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argument that substantive due process protected a student's property interest in
continued enrollment at a state medical school:
Most, if not all, state-created contract rights, while assuredly protected by
procedural due process, are not protected by substantive due process. The
substantive Due Process Clause is not concerned with the garden-variety
issues of common law contract Its concerns are far narrower, but at the
same time, far more important. Substantive due process affords only those
protections so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental.'39
The same court, acting within this principle, concluded that the freedom to pursue
an education without governmental racial discrimination did constitute a liberty
interest within the protection of substantive due process."
Other courts also have suggested a meaningful distinction between interests
protected by substantive due process and those protected by procedural due
process.'4 ' Mautilo v. UniversiV of Medne and Dentistry ofNewJers9yP2 involved the
dismissal of a doctoral student for, interalia, doing poor research. After dealing with
the procedural due process issue, the court observed: "We share Justice Powel's
doubt about the existence of such a substantive due process right in the
circumstances here. ,, Still other courts seem to have made little of this
distinction. In Hurst v. Univerity of Washington,'" for example, the court noted that
the plaintiff "arguably can state a substantive due process claim if his failing grades
prevented his graduation or led to his academic dismissal.' 45 This type of talk, of
course, reflects that imbuing procedural due process cases."'
In discussing substantive due process, it is crucial to distinguish the interest
required-life, liberty, orproperty-from the criterion for its violation-arbitrariness
or capriciousness. If alleging arbitrary and capricious decision making were itself
' Thomas v. Gee, 850 F. Supp. 665, 675 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (quoting Charles v. Baesler, 910
F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted)).
14' See id at 676. This, added the court, presented one of the situations in which the Due
Process Clause overlapped the equal protection clause. See id
" See Pamela W. Fletcher & Stephen R. Ripps, Rights of Students in Higher Education: A Due
Process Emphads, 70 LAw LIBRLJ. 277 (1977).
142 781 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1986).
'4- Id at 52. See also Schuler v. Univ. of Minn., 788 F.2d 510,515 (8th Cir. 1986); Thoma, 850
F. Supp. at 674 (holding state-created contract right not enough to trigger substantive due process).
'4 See No. 89-35645, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 7925 (9th Cir. Apr. 19,1991).
14s Id at *6.
"6 See text accompanying note 108 etseq.
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enough, then any loss-a three-minute banishment from the recreation room--could
form the basis of federal litigation under substantive due process. Thus could
substantive due process, contrary to Justice Powell's insistence, become, at least in
one sense, more encompassing than procedural due process.
Alas, the Supreme Court has failed to pitch in meaningfiflly; it has disdained
deciding not only whether substantive due process calls for a different or narrower
interest in the higher education context, but also whether students in public higher
education have either a procedural or a substantive due process interest at stake in
their continued enrollment.47
The language and judicial history of the Due Process Clause reflect a
dilemma: On the one hand, the Due Process Clause seems so procedurally oriented
that one should limit its substantive impact by limiting the interests substantively
protected; on the other hand, the clause mentions "liberty and property" but once,
with no suggestion that each of these terms has dual meanings, depending on the
aspect of due process under consideration.
For purposes of the higher education context, happily, results will not likely
turn on any such distinction. Any interest that would fall within Justice Powell's
interpretation of liberty or property for purposes of substantive due process afortioi
would qualify for procedural due process. Moreover, as we shall see,' whenever the
criterion for a violation of substantive due process would be met in the higher
educational context, almost certainly too would that for a violation of procedural due
process.
IV. THE PROCESS REQUIRED
The Supreme Court's "big four" made clear that disciplinary cases warrant
an adjudication different from that in academic ones.' We turn now to consider
how lower courts have dealt with this prescription. Of course, the "big four," while
long on generalities, came up quite short on specifics. The two disciplinary cases,
"4 Seetextaccompanying note 68 eseq. SeeNOWAK&ROTUNDA, .frranote 56, at 541 (making
no distinction between the nature of a property interest qualifying for protection under procedural due
process and that qualifying for protection under substantive due process). See also idL at 579 n.1 14
(discussingEning). Cf. Akins v. Bd. ofGovernors of State Coll. and Univ., 840 F.2d 1371,1376-77 (7th
Cir. 1988).
141 See text accompanying note 318.
149 See M. Michele Fournet, Note, Due Process and the UniveAhy Student: The Academic/ Dihcpnaty
Dichotomy, 37 LA. L REv. 939 (1977). Seegenra/,CurtisJ. Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Dishlne:
A Guide to Fair Proessfor the Utivesity Studxt, 99 COLuM. L REV. 289 (1999).
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Goss and Ingraham, dealt with K-12 education and not higher education. Moreover,
the short suspension at issue in Goss mandated only the most sunrpary of hearings;
the corporal punishment in Ingraham required no hearing whatsoever. These cases,
therefore, told us little of the procedures constitutionally requisite when colleges and
universities hand down suspensions, especially long ones, or expulsions in
disciplinary cases.' °
Both of the academic cases among the "big four" did involve higher
education and therefore provided more help, although the criteria of constitutionality
emanating from them left many questions. Taken together, the four cases seem to
teach that, when liberty or property is at stake, procedural due process requires a
hearing for disciplinary cases. Procedural due process requires no hearing for
academic cases, though the decision must be "careful and deliberate." '' Substantive
due process, even if applicable to the higher education context, largely overlaps the
procedural requirement, decreeing that the result in academic matters be reached
conscientiously and with careful deliberation; institutional judgments will not be
overturned unless they represent "such a substantial departure from accepted
academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not
actually exercise professional judgment."' 52
A. Disciplinary
Although fundamental fairness remains crucial, the demands of due process
with regard to disciplinary procedures are flexible. 3 In In graham, the U.S. Supreme
Court noted that the extent of procedural protection in disciplinary cases depends
upon three variables: 1) the nature of the interest protected; 2) the danger of error
and the benefit of additional or other procedures; and 3) the burden on the
government such procedures would present.14 Lower courts have echoed each
"s See Bleicker v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 485 F. Supp. 1381, 1387 (S.D. Ohio
1980) (requiring more formal procedures for suspension for several months and perhaps permanently
than does a short high school suspension).
, See Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 85 (1978).
's Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,225 (1985) (citations omitted).
153 See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7,12 (1st Cir. 1988); Gagne v. Trustees of Ind. Univ.,
692 N.E.2d 489, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Henderson State Univ. v. Spadoni, 848 S.W.2d 951, 953
(Ark. Ct. App. 1993). Cf Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex.
1995) (applying Texas parallel to Due Process Clause); Lucas v. Hahn, 648 A.2d 839, 842 (Vt. 1994).
See genera, .y William M. Beaney, Fairness in Unimriy Disdnaty Predings, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 390
(1971).
"s, See text accompanying note 23 et seq.; Siblerud v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 896 F. Supp.
1506, 1516 (D. Colo. 1995) (diaum). Cf Than, 901 S.W.2d at 930 (applying Texas parallel to Due
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specific of this pronouncement... In Donohue v. Baker,"s6 for example, the court,
assessing whether a student charged with rape had the right to cross-examine
witnesses against him, said: "The opportunity to make two statements to a
disciplinary panel might suffice in the case of alleged misconduct that could result in
a short suspension from school. But the plaintiff here faced expulsion and
procedures necessarily had to take on a higher level of formality to ensure
fairness."' 7 In Martin v. Helstad,ss an applicant's acceptance to law school was
revoked due to his omitting to note on his application a conviction for securities
fraud. The Seventh Circuit concluded that notice of the problem and the
opportunity to explain the lapse satisfied due process; no oral, personal exchange was
needed. The court found negligible both the risk of erroneous determination and
any increased reliability that might flow from additional procedures. In Osteen v.
Henley,159 an expelled student argued that due process entitled him to representation
by counsel at his disciplinary proceeding. The same court, though recognizing the
student's large stake in this expulsion case, cited the inordinate cost to the university
that would result from "judicializing disciplinary proceedings."'
Nonetheless, elaborating upon the fundamental principles distilled from the
"big four" remains difficult. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that in
individual cases courts often tell us that the procedures followed by the institution
satisfied due process, but do not specify which, singly or in combination, were
essential. Many situations reaching the courts involve penalties much more serious
than that involved in Goss and, accordingly, become candidates for more extensive
protections.1
6 1
Process Clause). Such concerns affect academic cases too. See Ezekwo v. NYC Health and Hosp.
Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the financial and administrative burden that
[notice] imposes would be minimal). See id at 790 (dissenting opinion) (plaintiff had smaller interest
at stake than Horouditand therefore was due less process); Qvyjtv. Lin, 932 F. Supp. 1100,1106 (N.D.
II1. 1996).
"ss See Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221 (7th Cir. 1993); Martin v. Helstad, 699 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.
1983); Gorman, 837 F.2d 7(holding that beyond notice and hearing, span of procedural protections
depends on careful weighing of competing interests implicated in the particular case); Donohue v.
Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Haley v. Va. Commw. Univ., 948 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va.
1996); Than, 901 S.W.2d at 926; Mary M. v. Clark, 473 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
" 976 F. Supp. at 136.
7 Id at 147.
1 699 F.2d at 387.
159 13 F.3d 221.
" 13 F.3d at 226. The court also found it relatively unlikely that the university would unjustly
expel the student Id
161 See North v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 332 S.E.2d 141, 144 (W. Va. 1985) (requiring more
process for permanent deprivations than for temporary ones).
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Whatever the threatened sanctions, though, college and university
disciplinary proceedings, while they require more process than academic cases," are
not criminal trials. Students, therefore, are not entitled to all the procedural
safeguards accorded criminal defendants."6 (One court put it starkly: "[P]etitioner's
assignments of error... amount only to a complaint that he did not receive the same
'due process' during his disciplinary hearing that he would have received in a trial for
treason.. ."))' This policy finds support not only in the idea that less is at risk in
disciplinary matters than in criminal cases, but also in the notion that non-adversarial
settings that stress the educational functions of disciplinary procedures best serve the
student interest1'6 The Supreme Court itself stated in Goss, "[F]urther formalizing
the suspension process and escalating its.. . adversary nature may... destroy its
effectiveness as part of the teaching process."'66 (One could wonder, however, how
much of the educational aspect remains when a student at the college or university
level faces expulsion-such situations reek of adversariness). Moreover, the Due
Process Clause does not require that disciplinary proceedings be ideal, or even that
they be the best possible, but that they be fair." Even in relatively serious
disciplinary cases, therefore, an "informal give-and-take" between student and
university decision maker may suffice;16 a "full-dress judicial hearing" is not
required.""
'62 See text accompanying note 283. Cf. Siblerud v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 896 F. Supp. 1506,
1513 n.13 (D. Colo. 1995) (dictum).
" See Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 664 (11th Cir. 1987);Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of
Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245,1250 (E.D.Mich. 1984); Knapp v.Jr. Coll. Dist, 879 S.W.2d 588,592 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1994). Indeed, neither disciplinary nor academic cases require the level of procedural
protection appropriate for loss-of-employment cases. Davis v. Mann, 882 F.2d 967, 973 (5th Cir.
1989). See general# Richard Maxwell, Note, Ruks of Esidenct in Dirdinay Hearings in State-Supported
Uiverdties, 1 TEX. TECH L RaV. 357 (1970).
t6 North, 332 S.E.2d at 144.
s See Mary M. v. Clark, 473 N.Y.S.2d 843, 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
" Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1967).
167 See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988).
t Amelunxen v. Univ. of P.R., 637 F. Supp. 426,431 (D.P.R. 1986); Gagne v. Trustees of nd.
Univ., 692 N.E.2d 489, 493 (Ind. Ct App. 1998); Reilly v. Daly, 666 N.E.2d 439,444 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996). SeeShuman v. Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., 451 N.W.2d 71, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
"notice and some opportunity to be heard" will do).
16 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 16 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that hearings need not mirror common
law trials); Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 664 (11th Cir. 1987); Lipsett v. Univ. of P. R., 637
F. Supp. 789, 807 (D.P.R. 1986), rev'd on othergmunds, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Henson v.
Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69,75 (4th Cir. 1983)); Gagne, 692 N.E.2d at 494; Henderson
State Univ. v. Spadoni, 848 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993). In Henderson, interestingly, the
student sought a less formal procedure. He argued that restricting witnesses to answering questions
rather than allowing them to say what they wanted violated procedural due process. The court rejected
the argument, noting that the question-and-answer format typified judicial proceedings. Iad at 954.
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In serious disciplinary cases, at least the basic protections called for in Goss
will apply: notice7 ' and, in the event of a denial by the student, a statement of the
evidence relied upon, and a chance to rebut. 17  Beyond these, courts have been
understandably less sure172 and, accordingly, less consistent
The very word "notice" implies specificity sufficient to inform the student
of the charge,17 1 including perhaps any lesser charges that might be substituted, 74 and
Clearly, too, officials conducting a hearing have the discretion to limit the hearing to relevant issues.
See Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221,225 (7th Cir. 1993).
170 See Gorman 837 F.2d at 12; Cobb v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 84 F. Supp. 2d 740,749 (W.D.
Va. 2000); Carboni v. Meldrum, 949 F. Supp. 427, 437 (W.D. Va. 1996); Gagne, 692 N.E.2d at 493;
Rdl,666 N.E.2d at 444; Smith v. Denton, 895 S.W.2d 550,554 (Ark. 1995); Shuman, 451 N.W.2d at
74. Cf. Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995); and Alcom v.
Vaksman, 877 S.W.2d 390,397 (Tex. App. 1994) (applying Texas parallel to Due Process Clause).
Proof of actual notice may be inferred. In Adibi-Sadeh v. Bee County College, 454 F. Supp.
552, 558 (S.D. Tex. 1978), college officials sent notice of disruption charges to ninety-five Iranian
students through certified mail. Though some of these letters were returned undelivered, the court
found "fair and adequate" notice in light of the fact that copies of the letters were hand-delivered to
many of the students, that notices were posted around campus, that the campus was relatively small,
and that it was reasonable to assume that the Iranian community on campus was closely knit. I at
555-56.
171 See, e.g., Roach v. Univ. of Utah, 968 F. Supp. 1446,1452 (D. Utah 1997) (calling for notice
and some opportunity to be heard); Carini, 949 F. Supp. at 437 (requiring reasonable opportunity to
present her side of story); Aubuchon v. Olsen, 467 F. Supp. 568, 573 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (requiring
notice, opportunity to present accused's version and to rebut opposing evidence); Trahms v. Trustees
of Columbia Univ., 666 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Than, 901 S.W.2d at 930; Mary M.
v. Clark, 473 N.Y.S.2d 843,845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (requiring inclusion of notice of sanctions). See
also William R. Thierstein, Note, Colkge Studnt and Due Pross in Displinar Proceedings, 13 S.D. L REV.
87 (1968); Diego L Villarreal, Student's Constitutional Rights antdthe UniversityDiscipinaty Committee, 3 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 53 (1971).
172 'See Gornan, 837 F.2d at 14 (holding that beyond the right to notice and hearing, span of
procedural protections mandated by due process becomes uncertain).
" See Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961). A different but
related problem of "notice" arises with regard to the need to inform students beforehand of what
conduct is prohibited. Of course, the proscriptions of educational institutions need not manifest the
same definiteness as criminal statutes. SeeWoodis v. Westark Cmty. Coll., 160 F.3d 435,438 (8th Cir.
1998); Shamloo v. Miss. State Bd. of Trustees, 620 F.2d 516, 522 (5th 1980). Nonetheless, such
proscriptions must avoid both vagueness and overbreadth. See Tigrett v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 97
F. Supp. 2d 752,761 (W.D. Va. 2000); Reliford v. Univ. of. Akron, 610 N.E.2d 521,522 (Ohio Ct
App. 1991). Such a regulation is unconstitutionally vague if people of common intelligence must guess
at its meaning and differ as to its applicability. Predictably, regulations regarding speech require more
specificity than do others. See Shamloo, 620 F.2d at 523-24 (holding that "activities of 'wholesome'
nature" too vague).
174 Cf. Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238 (D. Vt. 1994). In Fellheimer, the college
charged the student with rape, but failed to notify him that, even if the rape charge should fail, he
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the regulations underlying the charge."' Although notice, at least objectively
considered,"' must be "meaningful," it need not include, for example, specific code
numbers)" Though oral notice might often suffice,17 expulsion cases may require
formal written notice.'79
In a seminal case regarding due process in disciplinary proceedings, Dixon
v. Alabama State Board of Education, " the Fifth Circuit stated that the threatened
expulsion required notice not only of the charges, but also of the names of witnesses
and, in oral or written form, their expected testimony.' Later, however, in Nash v.
Auburn Universiy," the Eleventh Circuit, successor to part of the Fifth Circuit, held
that a student in a disciplinary hearing had no right even to a summary of the expected
adverse testimony. The court distinguished Dixon, pointing out that the student in
Nash attended the hearing at which the witnesses testified.'83
Perhaps because the situation arises rarely or because of concerns regarding
over-formalization of disciplinary proceedings, virtually no litigation has addressed
what would be called, in criminal law, problems of "misjoinder." Presumably there
exist some limits, even in college and university proceedings, to the consolidation of
charges-perhaps "manifest prejudice," but those limits have remained largely
unstated. In Turof v. Kibbee,'" a federal district court provided some guidance in
could be found to have violated a student-handbook provision prohibiting disrespect ofpersons. The
court found that the college thus breached its contractual duty to inform him of the charges against
him with particularity.
"I See Main v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974). J. Clinton Eudy, Note,
Colleges and Unrivtniti - Contitut'onal Law. Lxga(l of Ewad Rules Gowidng Student Behavior, 48 N.C. L
REv. 943 (1970).
.76 See Foo v. Ind. Univ., 88 F. Supp. 2d 937, 950-51 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
n Tigrett, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 759.
178 See Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926,930 (Tex. 1995) (dictum).
"' SeeNorth v. W. Va. Bd. ofRegents, 332 S.E.2d 141,143 (W. Va. 1985). In Barletta v. State,
533 So. 2d 1037, 1040 (La. Ct. App. 1988), the court, while assuming the necessity of written notice
in expulsion cases, found it sufficient that the student's attorney received written notice and student
received actual notice of the particulars of the hearing.
ISO 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
" See ido at 158-59. See also Gruen v. Chase, 626 N.Y.S.2d 261, 262 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(requiring names of witnesses to be provided in expulsion case). Cf. Alcom v. Vaksman, 877 S.W.2d
390, 397 (Tex. App. 1994). SeegeneralhJeRoyd Greene, Note, Due Proessin Pub#c Collges and Universities
-Ned For Tdal-Type Headngs, How. L.J. 414 (1967).
182 812 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1987).
"' Ia at 662-63 (giving the witnesses' names to the student). See Knapp v. Jr. Coll. Dist., 879
S.W.2d 588, 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding there is no denial of due process when student not given
copies of statements and other documents pre-hearing).
'" 527 F. Supp. 880 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
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holding constitutional the joining of three unrelated charges against the student; the
student showed no prejudice from the combining of the charges. 8'
The concept of notice implies as well sufficient time between it and the
hearing to allow the student to prepare a defense."6 Of course, the student might
waive any objection to the timing by insisting upon a particular date for the
hearing.'87 Conversely, too much delay, if not occasioned by the student,' might
deny due process, as well.'
Although due process allows flexibility regarding disciplinary hearings, 10
courts find crucial the opportunity to be heard"' "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner."" 2 As the First Circuit has observed, "The hearing, to be fair
in the due process sense, implies that the person adversely affected was afforded the
las See id. at 886.
, See North v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 332 S.E.2d 141, 143 (W. Va. 1985). In assessing this
point, courts will look to the totality of circumstances. In Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F.
Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1984), the court found both sufficient notice of charges and a meaningful
opportunity to prepare for the hearing7 The student received a copy of the letter to the academic
judiciary accusing him of cheating, the dean met twice with him to discuss the charges and the
disciplinary process, the dean gave the student a manual setting out those procedures, and the hearing
took place about six weeks after notification of the charges.
'1 See Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
185 See Picozzi v. Sandalow, 623 F. Supp. 1571,1581 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
'8' See Main v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613 (D.P.R. 1974) (calling for expedited hearing);
Cobb v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 84 F. Supp. 2d 740 (W.D. Va. 2000). In Cobb, the student argued,
unsuccessfully, that a seven-month delay precluded him from remembering matters crucial to his
defense, for example where various people sat during the pertinent examination. See id. at 749-50
(discussing the relationship between delay and due process).
150 See Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 663 (11th Cir. 1987).
1' See, e.g., Gorman v. Univ. ofR.I., 837 F.2d 7,12 (1st Cir. 1988); Hall v. Med. Coll. of Ohio,
742 F.2d 299, 310 (6th Cir. 1984) (permitting him to offer evidence in his own behalf); Cobb, 84 F.
Supp. 2d at 749; Gagne v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 692 N.E.2d 489,493 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Reilly v.
Daly, 666 N.E.2d 439, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (opportunity for hearing appropriate to the case);
Gruen v. Chase, 626 N.Y.S.2d 261,262 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901
S.W.2d 926,930 (Iex. 1995); Smith v. Denton, 895 S.W.2d 550,554 (Ark. 1995); Alcom v. Vaksman,
877 S.W.2d 390,397 (Tex. App. 1994); Shuman v. Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., 451 N.W.2d 71,74 (Minn.
Ct App. 1990); Mary M. v. Clark, 473 N.Y.S.2d 843, 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (offering chance to
be heard and presentation of other evidence).
" Foo v. Ind. Univ., 88 F. Supp. 2d 937,954 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)); Van de Zilver v. Rutgers Univ., 971 F. Supp. 925, 932 (D.N.J. 1997);
Lipsettv. Univ. of P.R., 637 F. Supp. 789, 807 (D.P.R. 1986), nrv'don otbergroundk, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.
1988). Cf Ho v. Univ. of Tex., 984 S.W.2d 672, 684 (Tex. App. 1998); Than, 901 S.W.2d at 930
(applying Texas parallel to Due Process Clause).
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opportunity to respond, explain, and defend."'93  Nonetheless, the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination gives the student no right to put
off the campus hearing until a criminal trial, based on the same charges, has been
held."4 Nor may the student invoke the privilege at a disciplinary hearing and then
complain of a denial of the opportunity to testify there.19s He may remain silent at
the hearing and his silence may not be held against him at the criminal trial; should
he choose to testify on campus, his responses will be deemed voluntary and therefore
admissible at trial. In the unlikely event that the student is compelkd to testify on
campus,'99 the privilege will make his answers inadmissible at any subsequent
criminal al19 7
Important, at least in most cases,"'8 is the right to be present for all
significant aspects of the hearing. In Universiy of Texas Medical School v. Than,'9 a
third-year medical student found himself charged with cheating on a standardized
national examination. At one point during the hearing, the hearing officer,
accompanied by university counsel, visited the room in which the alleged cheating
had occurred in order to assess the layout of the room and to sit where the student
allegedly had sat; the student's request to go along was denied.' Recognizing that
certain circumstances might justify the exparte receipt of evidence in disciplinary
cases, the court nonetheless concluded that the "unrecorded ex parte inspection of
the testing site" had violated the student's "due course of law," the Texas
constitution's parallel2"' to federal due process: The student was "denied an
'" Gorman, 837 F.2d at 13; Rei/j, 666 N.E.2d at 444; Gagne, 692 N.E.2d at 493.
' See Nzuve v. Castleton State Coll., 335 A.2d 321,325-26 (Vt. 1975). Cf Adibi-Sadeh v. Bee
County Coll., 454 F. Supp. 552,558 (S.D. Tex. 1978); A MODEL CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT § 8,
in Pavela, supra note 2, at 818.
"o SeeAdibi-Sadeh, 454 F. Supp. at 558. See Paul E. Rosenthal, Speak Now: TheAccsedSitudent's
Right to Remain Siknt in Pubfic Univmsi, Didtinay Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1241 (1997).
196 See A MODEL CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT § 32, in Pavela, supra note 2, at 823 ("an
accused student must respond to inquiries from the presiding officer and the hearing board.")
(emphasis added).
19 See Nuve, 335 A.2d at 326.
19, See Martin v. Helstad, 699 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1983), discussed at text accompanying note 157.
Cf Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (turning largely on credibility, accused had
right to hear all evidence against him in expulsion case). Of course, one could hear all evidence (for
example, through close-circuit television) and still not be physically present.
"' 901 S.W.2d 926 (rex. 1995).
' Seeidat 932.
31 l at 932. See TEX. CONST. art I, § 19: "No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life,
liberty, [or] property.. . except by the due course of the law of the land." Despite the textual
differences between this clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Texas
Supreme Court has found no "meaningful distinction." Id at 929.
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opportunity to respond to a new piece of evidence against him, and the
countervailing burden on the state [was] slight .. . .202 Implicit in "presence," as
Than itself suggests, is the opportunity to present evidence."3
However elaborate the hearing, its constitutional meaningfulness might still
be negated. In lghtsy v. K'n#ge despite a midshipman's acquittal on a charge of
cheating, the Merchant Marine Academy refused to change his grade of "zero" for
the course. Stressed the court "There is no difference between failing to provide a
due process hearing and providing one but ignoring the outcome.""''
Predictably, hearings need not be open to the public, formal rules of
evidence need not be deployed, 7 witnesses need not be put under oath 8 and the
exclusionary rule need not be applied.' Indeed, because the hearing board
comprises lay members, one cannot expect it to administer highly technical
evidentiary rules.
210
Usually the institution need not allow, let alone provide, active
representation by legal counsel.211 (Some courts have stated that legal counsel's
Id at 932. The medical school then provided Mr. Than a new hearing, whose result he also
challenged, this time in federal court. The Fifth Circuit upheld the result, finding no due process
violation. See Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 188 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1999).
' See Matin v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974); North v. W. Va. Bd. of
Regents, 332 S.E.2d 141,143 (W. Va. 1985). Cf. Mary M. v. Clark, 473 N.Y.S.2d 843,845 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984).
1 567 F. Supp. 645 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
s Id. at 649. The court called the hearing a "mere sham." It at 650.
20 See Hart v. Ferris State Coll., 557 F. Supp. 1379, 1389 (W.D. Mich. 1983) ( finding that an
open hearing would more likely produce disruption than increased accuracy).
' See Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 663 (11th Cir. 1987); Henson v. Honor Comm.
of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69,73 (4th Cir. 1983). Cf. A MODEL CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT % 19
& 300), in Pavela, supra note 2, at 820 ('Formal rules of evidence shall not be applied .... ," though
rules of confidentiality and privilege will be.).
See Knapp v.Jr. Coll. Dist., 879 S.W.2d 588,592 (Mo. Ct App. 1994).
_o See Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 1000-01 (D.N.H. 1976); Ekelund v. Sec'y of
Commerce, 418 F. Supp. 102,106 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Contra Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777,794-
95 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
210 See Smjth, 398 F. Supp. at 800.
211 See, e.g., Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221 (7th Cir. 1993); Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d
7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988); Henson, 719 F.2d at 73; Navato v. Sletten, 560 F.2d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 1977);
Roach v. Univ. of Utah, 968 F. Supp. 1446,1452 (D. Utah 1997); Turof v. Kibbee, 527 F. Supp. 880,
885 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Haynes v. Dallas Cmty. Jr. Coll. Dist, 386 F. Supp. 208,212 (N.D. Tex. 1974);
Gruen v. Chase, 626 N.Y.S.2d 261, 262 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (holding that although university not
required to provide legal representation to students, university did not prevent them from having an
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participation might be mandated if the college or university proceeds through
counsel).2 2 In Donohue,1 a student who had been indicted for rape was expelled.
Regarding his complaint that denial of counsel at the hearing violated procedural due
process, the court stressed that there was no absolute right to counsel in such
situations. To be sure, if the student had needed counsel in order to protect his Fifth
Amendment privilege during the hearing, his argument might have succeeded. But
here he sought counsel not for that purpose but to prevail at the disciplinary
hearing.214 Several courts have required that retained counsel be allowed.2 ' In any
event, allowing retained counsel2 6 or appointing a non-attorney advisor for the
student may play well with a court,217 even though due process may not require that
such counsel or advisor be allowed to cross-examine witnesses,2 8 otherwise speak
at the hearing,219 or even attend.'
attorney serve as advisor); Mary M. v. Clark, 473 N.Y.S.2d 843, 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). Cf. Hall
v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 742 F.2d 299, 309 (6th Cir. 1984) (failing to clearly establish right to counsel);
Garshman v. Pa. State Univ.,395 F. Supp. 912, 920-21 (M.D. Pa. 1975); A MODELCODE OFSTUDENT
CONDUCT § 32, in Pavela, supra note 2, at 823 (allowing the accused student an advisor, "who may be
an attorney"); id, § 30 (m) (allowing the accused student, but not the "advisor," to question witnesses).
State statutes granting the right to retained counsel before state agencies may apply to students
appearing before college or university disciplinary committees. See Kusnir v. Leach, 439 A.2d 223,227
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982). See general4 Mark S. Blaskey, Universit Student's Rigbt to Retain Counsel for
Dislina Proceedings, 24 CAL W. L REV. 65 (1987); Nicholas Trott Long, TheStandardofProofin Student
Disdo/hnagy Cases, 12J.C. & U.L 71 (1985); Douglas R. Richmond, Student's Rigt to Counselin Universiy
Dissdpinaoy Proceedings, 15 J.C. & U.L 289 (1989).
212 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 16; Turof, 527 F. Supp. at 885.
213 976 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
214 See id at 146 (citing Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 103,106 (1st Cir. 1978)).
215 See Marin v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 624 (D.P.R. 1974); French v. Bashful, 303 F.
Supp. 1333,1338 (E.D. La. 1969); North v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 332 S.E.2d 141,143 (W. Va. 1985)
(holding due process requires the opportunity to have retained counsel at hearing).
216 See Knapp v.Jr. Coll. Dist., 879 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
217 See Gruen v. Chase, 626 N.Y.S.2d 261,262 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); May M., 473 N.Y.S.2d
at 845. Cf. A MODEL CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT § 2(0, in Pavela, supra note 2, at 817 (granting
students the right "[t]o be advised by a person of their choice").
21 See Hart v. Ferris State Coll., 557 F. Supp. 1379,1388-89 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
219 See Univ. of Houston v. Sabeti, 676 S.W.2d 685, 688-89 (Tex. App. 1984) (suggesting that
the result might differ if the institution had proceeded through counsel, attorney or otherwise). In
Crook P. Baker, 813 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1987), a university moved to revoke a degree on the grounds of
fraud. The court found no constitutional problem in denying the graduate's attorney the opportunity
to examine or cross-examine witnesses or to make an oral presentation to the Committee. The lawyer
did address the Board of Regents, to which the Committee reported. Id at 99. Cf. A MODEL CODE
OF STUDENT CONDUCT § 30(m) in Pavela, spra note 2, at 817 (allowing the accused student, but not
the "advisor," to question witnesses); id at § 32 (granting the advisor, subject to the presiding officer's
discretion, the opportunity to make brief opening and closing statements, and to suggest to the panel
questions that might be put to witnesses). A Code annotation states that the "active control" of
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At least in serious cases, students should have the right to call exculpating
witnesses."m One hurdle faced by students in disciplinary hearings concerns the
inability to compel the attendance of such witnesses. Of course, the institution may
have more leverage in this regard, not only with students but especially with
employees, such as members of the security department. This situation in itself
probably will not violate due process, especially if the student has succeeded in
attracting some witnesses to the hearing.m One might anticipate more litigation on
this rarely raised point, however, especially if the institution makes no effort to
enable the student to bring witnesses to the hearing. Institutions might be well
advised to require the attendance of students and employees sought as witnesses by
accused students in disciplinary hearings. m
Although the right to cross-examine opposing witnesses in disciplinary
hearings is not constitutionally de riugeur,' serious cases, ms especially when the
credibility of a witness looms crucial, may require it. In Donohue v. Baker,226 a student
was expelled for date rape. At his hearing, the chief magistrate, invoking an
disciplinary cases assumed by the decisionmaker reduces the role of counsel. Id at 5 32 n. 29.
' SeeJaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245,1252 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (noting
that university did not proceed through counsel or other representative, and issues were not "unduly
complex").
22 See De Prima v. Columbia-Greene Cmty. Coll., 392 N.Y.S.2d 348,350 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Spec.
Term 1977) (expulsion). Cf A MODEL CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT § 2(e), in Pavela, .trua note 2,
at 817.
" SeeTurofv. Kibbee, 527 F. Supp. 880,886 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Knapp v.Jr. Coll. Dist.,
879 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Mo. Ct App. 1994) (stating there is no denial of due process when student not
allowed to compel testimony of person who investigated incident at issue).
"' Cf A MODEL CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT § 30(c), in Pavela, supra note 2, at 822-23.
("University students and employees are expected to comply with subpoenas issued pursuant to this
[code], unless compliance would result in significant and unavoidable personal hardship, or substantial
interference with normal University activities .... ).
224 See Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545,549 (2d Cir. 1972) (allowing student's admission of
presence at site of disruption); Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136,147 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Lipsett v.
Univ. of P.R., 637 F. Supp. 789, 813 (D.P.R. 1986), av'don othergroundr, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988)
(finding that right to cross-examine important but not absolute; context important); Jaksa, 597 F.
Supp. at 1252; Reilly v. Daly, 666 N.E.2d 439,444 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Knapp, 879 SW.2d at 592.
But see Mann v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974) (requiring right to cross-examine
in suspension case); De Prima, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 350 (expulsion); North v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 233
S.E.2d 411,417 (W. Va. 1977) (finding that expulsion case carries right to confront witnesses). Cf A
MODEL CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT % 2(e) & 30 (mm), in Pavela, xara note 2, at 817.
s See North v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 332 S.E.2d 141, 143 (noting expulsion carries with it
right to confront witnesses). Presumably this confrontation includes cross-examination of adverse
witnesses, not merely presence during their testimony.
976 F. Supp. 136.
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exception in the Student Conduct Code for Peg sens ive situations,"7 denied the student
the opportunity to cross-examine the alleged victim. The federal district court made
clear that the distress such cases can cause complaining witnesses does not inevitably
trump constitutional concerns:
It is understandable that the panel would wish to alter the proceedings in an
effort to protect the alleged victim from additional trauma. However, this
concern, and the presence of provisions in the Conduct Code permitting
[dispensation with] cross-examination, does not end this Court's inquiry into
the fundamental fairness of the hearing. Regardless of how "sensitive" the
proceeding was deemed to be, the defendants remained bound to observe
the plaintiff's constitutional rights.'
The court stressed that the case turned largely on credibility-the alleged
rapist's versus the alleged victim's. Some form of confrontation became
indispensable: "At the very least... due process required that the panel permit the
[accused] to... direct questions to his accuser through the panel." (The court
conceded that the hearing might have sufficed had the resulting penalty been a short
suspension).230 In Gorman v. Universiy of Rhode Island,"1 the First Circuit found no
constitutional violation when a student, though allowed to cross-examine adverse
witnesses regarding the alleged incident itself, was prohibited from probing their
possible bias."2
In any event, institutions clearly may impose reasonable limits on cross-
examination. In Abidi-Sadh a Bee County College," 3 ninety-five Iranian students were
charged with campus disruption. The institution proceeded in two separate stages.
The first involved a presentation of the evidence against the entire group. The
second involved a series of individualized hearings at which each charged student
could present exculpatory evidence. The attorney for the students refused to cross-
examine adverse witnesses at the group segment of the hearing, insisting instead on
cross-examination of these witnesses at each individualized hearing. The court not
227 It at 147.
Id at 147.
Id (leaving unclear the extent whether the panel had allowed the accused this opportunity).
See also Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 664 (11th Cir. 1987) (directing questions to witnesses
unnecessary; questioning through panel sufficed).
' See Donohmw, 976 F. Supp. at 147.
231 837 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1988).
232 See id. at 16.
23 454 F. Supp. 552 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
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only found this demand unreasonable, but also concluded that rejection of the
opportunity to cross-examine at the group segment constituted a waiver3 4
Although one might waive the point by failing to object,O5 a fair hearing
obviously requires a fair decisionmaker." 6 In this context, however, "fair" does not
mean "ultimate." In Smith . Rector of University of Virginia ' a federal court rejected
the argument that a sanctioned student had the right to appear before the university
president, who had the final word in the matter. The student's "meaningful" hearing
before the disciplinary panel satisfied due process. To rule otherwise, the court
noted, would preclude all appeals.
238
Nor does "fair" mean the absence of every possible conflict of interest. Just
as a judge, though paid by the state, may decide controversies between citizens and
the state, so too may employees of universities, even if selected by university
officials,"' sit in judgment when those very universities bring charges against
students.24°
While an unbiased tribunal remains essential24' and those sittingin judgment,
therefore, should normally have had no previous involvement in the matter,24 2 not
all such involvement will taint the result. In Henderson State Universit v. Spadoni,243 the
court found unobjectionable the presence on the disciplinary committee of a student
from the same fraternity as the victim of the alleged assault.' Afortiori, mere prior
knowledge of the incident at issue does not disqualify a decisionmaker.2"
In Jackson v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania,2" a student unsuccessfully
argued the impropriety of her suspension on the ground that the prosecutorial and
adjudicatory functions had been wrongly commingled. Said the court: "Mhe mere
See id at 556.
s See Tigrett v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 97 F. Supp. 2d 752,761-62 (W.D. Va. 2000).
2 See Jenkins v. La State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992, 1003 (5th Cir. 1975); Carboni v.
Meldrurn, 949 F. Supp. 427,437 (W.D. Va. 1996) (requiring neutral decisionmaker).
' 78 F. Supp. 2d 533 (W.D. Va. 1999).
238 See id at 540-41.
9 See North v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 332 S.E.2d 141,145 (W. Va. 1985).
.. See Jenkins, 506 F.2d at 1003.
241 See Main v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974); North, 332 S.E.2d at 143
(at least for expulsion cases).
242 See Matin, 377 F. Supp. at 623.
243 848 S.W.2d 951 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993).
244 See id at 954.
24 See Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 666 (11th Cir. 1987).
695 A.2d 980 (Pa. Cornrw. Ct 1997).
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tangential involvement of an adjudicator in the decision to initiate proceeding[s] is
not enough to raise the red flag of procedural due process." '247 So too may a dean,
absent overt bias or previous involvement, conduct a hearing despite his position as
a member of the administrative bffice that formally initiates disciplinary
proceedings.24 In Gorman,249 a staff member provided advice to the disciplinary
board, participated with the board as a non-voting member, served as a witness in
another hearing, prepared records of hearings, and represented the board in internal
appeals. The First Circuit concluded that these multiple roles did not compromise
the independence of the disciplinary board.m Nor does holding the hearing in the
office of the dean of students, who filed the charge, constitutionally taint the
proceeding."m Of course, one who chaired the hearing committee should not also
hear the appeal from that committee's findings and recommendations.25 In court,
students asserting bias may bear the burden of producing evidence sufficient to
overcome the presumption of integrity and objectivity with which the judicial process
may clothe institutional decisionmakers m
Judicial opinion varies concerning the extent of the need for-as opposed
to the wisdom' of-a record of the hearing; a complete record of the proceedings
may be unnecessary.2 s A record becomes especially important, of course, with
regard to any portions of the hearing to which the student has not been privy.5 6 In
any event, even courts requiring an "adequate record"'m7 likely will not insist on a
stenographic record; a tape recording will do.2s In fact, even a tape recording may
247 I at 982 (quoting Lyness v. State Bd. of Med., 605 A.2d 1204,1209 (1992)).
2.8 See Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1972).
249 837 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1988).
See id at 15.
zs See Haynes v. Dallas Cmty. Jr. Coll. Dist., 386 F. Supp. 208,211-12 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
z See Marshall v. Maguire, 424 N.Y.S.2d 89,91-92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1980).
253 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at15.
. SeeJaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1252 (E.D. Mich. 1984) ("I am
not persuaded that the Due Process Clause requires the University to provide a verbatim transcript of
the hearing. While this case illustrates the wisdom of recording such hearings, it is dear that the
Constitution does not impose such a requirement.").
s See id. See alto Trahms v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 666 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (N.Y. App.
Div.1997).
' See Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1995), discussed in text
accompanying note 194.
2s North v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 332 S.E.2d 141,143 (W. Va. 1985) (finding that the record
was sufficient to support expulsion).
' See Navato v. Sletten, 560 F.2d 340,345 (8th Cir. 1977); Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ.,
514 F.2d 622,625 (10th Cir. 1975) (allowing student to tape-record the hearing). Cf Mary M. v. Clark,
473 N.Y.S.2d 843, 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (finding that a written record was not required); A
MODEL CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT § 30(g), in Pavela, supra note 2, at 823 C'Hearings shall be tape
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not be necessary. The First Circuit found no constitutional infirmity when a
university prohibited the charged student from tape recording the hearing himself;
the written summary of the testimony, evidence and decision the university provided
him sufficed. s9 Of course, the Constitution does not mandate a record of any
hearing from which the appeal itself is de novo. 2"
Results adverse to the student should be supported by at least "substantial
evidence.""ast Students should learn in a timely fashion how things turned out.
Accordingly, they should receive a record of the decisionmaker's findings,s the
evidence supporting those findings. 3 and perhaps the reasoning involved.2'
Statements setting out factual findings and the evidence supporting them play a
crucial role in assuring a result based on evidence in the record and in allowing the
recorded or transcribed.").
See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1988).
w See Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 1003 (D.N.H. 1976).
m' Gagne v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 692 N.E.2d 489,493 (Ind. Ct App. 1998); Reilly v. Daly,
666 N.E.2d 439, 445 (nd. Ct. App. 1996) (holding "substantial evidence" suffices; "dear and
convincing" unnecessary); Fain v. Brooklyn Coil. Univ. of N.Y., 493 N.Y.S.2d 13,15 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985). Cf. Kalinsky v. State Univ. of N.Y., 557 N.Y.S.2d 577,579 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (stating that
"dear and convincing" evidence is unnecessary to establish plagiarism); AMODELCODEOFSTUDENT
CONDUCT §§ 2(h) & 30(k), in Pavela, x~ra note 2, at 817 (calling for "dear and convincing evidence").
Many colleges and universities apply a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Id. at § 2(h) n.4
(citing Nicholas Trott Long, The Standard of Proof in Student Disdplinagy Carer, 12 J.C. & U.L 71, 80-81
(1985)). On questions of fact concerning which conflicting evidence arises, courts should defer to the
disciplinary committee. Henderson State Univ. v. Spadoni, 848 S.W.2d 951,954 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993).
Moreover, on appeal, a court need find only "some evidence to support the decision of the school or
college disciplinary board." Rei/, 666 N.E.2d at 446.
" See Main v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974); French v. Bashful, 303 F.
Supp. 1333, 1339 (E.D. La. 1969); Gruen v. Chase, 626 N.Y.S.2d 261,262 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). Cf.
Slaughter, 514 F.2d at 625 (holding due process entitles student to notice of committee's decision,
induding its decision to expel student). Cf. Kaltnky, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 578; Maty,., 473 N.Y.S.2d at
845 (holding student should be informed of finding and have access to decision and written report of
penalty). Findings may have to be relatively specific. See Hardison v. Fla. Agric. and Mech. Univ., 706
So. 2d 111,112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding must specify unlawfulness of touching in order to
preclude self-defense, since student charged with "assault and battery"). Cf. A MODEL CODE OF
STUDENT CONDUCT § 30(p), in Pavela, s4'ra note 2, at 823 (entitling the student to "brief written
findings," but not the evidence supporting those findings or the panel's reasoning).
13 See Hall v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 742 F.2d 299, 310 (6th Cir. 1984); Morale, 422 F. Supp. at
1004; Madn, 377 F. Supp. at 623. Cf. Kalinsky. 557 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
2' Compart Morak, 422 F. Supp. at 1004; andMarn, 377 F. Supp. at 623 (stating that student
should receive decisionmaker's reasoning) uAtbJaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245,
1253-54 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (denying student the right to detailed statement of reasons supporting guilt
since in this case such a statement would add little to studenes knowledge).
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student effectively to challenge that result both within the institution and in the
courts.6 s
In conducting disciplinary proceedings, colleges and universities are well
advised to follow whatever internal rules have been established, even if those rules
do not themselves reflect constitutional requisites. Conceivably, significant
deviations may constitute a violation of procedural due process, at least if the lapses
induced the student's reasonable and detrimental reliance.266 To be sure, courts
generally find no constitutional problem in the failure itself to honor such rules.' 7
In Carboni v. Meldrum, 2 8 for example, departure from its own rules by a state
veterinary college gave rise to no federal concern. The federal district court stressed
that alleged due process violations must be measured against federal requirements;
requirements that cannot be defined by state-created procedures.
269
Nonetheless, state courts may deem fatal to the institution's case significant
variance from internal constraints."0 New York's courts have been especially vigilant
in enforcing regulations appearing in the handbooks of in-state institutions.271 In
See Kalinsky, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
"- See Cobb v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 69 F. Supp. 2d 815, 830 (W.D. Va. 1999). As it turns
out, the court found no deviations, significant or otherwise. 84 F. Supp. 2d 740,748 (W.D. Va. 2000).
Cf A MODEL CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT §19, in Pavela, supra note 2, at 820 (providing that
deviation from the code's provisions "necessarily" invalidate a decision absent the possibility of
"significant prejudice to the student or to the University").
"7 See Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221,225 (7th Cir. 1993); Hall, 742 F.2d at 309 ("[A] violation
of internal rules does not establish a cognizable constitutional violation ... !"); Tigrett v. Rector of
Univ. of Va., 97 F. Supp. 2d 752, 758 (W.D. Va. 2000); Foo v. Ind. Univ., 88 F. Supp. 2d 937, 952
(S.D. Ind. 1999); Carboni v. Meldrum, 949 F. Supp. 427,437 (E.D. Va. 1996); Picozzi v. Sandalow,
623 F. Supp. 1571, 1579-1580 (E.D. Mich. 1986);Jaksra 597 F. Supp. at 1251; Wilkenfield v. Powell,
577 F. Supp. 579, 583 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (citing Hill v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 537 F.2d 248,252 (7th
Cir. 1976)); Edwards v. Bd. of Regents of Northwest Miss. State Univ., 397 F. Supp. 822,830 (W.D.
Mo. 1975). The Supreme Court has dealt obliquely with the issue in an academic case. See Bd. of
Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S.78, at 92, n.8; id at 108, n.22. But see Smith v.
Denton, 895 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Ark. 1995) (holding that institution's failure to follow its own rules
violates due process).
' 949 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Va. 1996).
29 I at 437.
:' See Morrison v. Univ. of Or. Health Sci. Ctr., 685 P.2d 439,441 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
" See Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1306 (N.Y. 1980); Gruen v. Chase, 626
N.Y.S.2d 261,262 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Weidemann v. State Univ. of N.Y. Coll., 592 N.Y.S.2d 99,
101 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (requiring substantial compliance at both public and private institutions);
Heisler v. N.Y. Med. Coll., 449 N.Y.S.2d 834, 837 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). See also Trahms v. Trustees
of Columbia Univ., 666 N.Y.S.2d 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (upholding the disciplinary action taken
against the student-plaintiff, the court cited the university's substantial compliance with its own
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Tedeschi v. Vagner Colkge,a 2 the institution expelled the plaintiff without adhering to
its own procedural edicts. 3 The New York court needed no federal constitutional
proclamations to void the college's action:
Whether by analogy to the law of associations, on the basis of a supposed
contract between university and student, or simply as a matter of essential
fairness in the somewhat one-sided relationship between the institution and
the individual ...when a university has adopted a rule or guideline
establishing the procedure to be followed in relation to suspension or
expulsion that procedure must be substantially observed. 4
Moreover, all courts, state and federal, will likely be less inclined to credit the
institution's efforts when it fails to live up to its own procedures." Of course,
failure to follow local rules that themselves enshrine due process requirements will
violate the federal Constitution.'7
Finally, due process does not require institutions to provide internal appeals
from adverse determinations reached through a constitutionally acceptable hearing. 7
Nonetheless, most colleges and universities wisely provide for such recourse.
Courts seem more willing to interpose their judgments in disciplinary cases
than in academic ones, presumably on the grounds that the former "involve
determinations quite closely akin to the day-to-day work of the judiciary. '"" Even
published guidelines for such procedures); Harris v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 470 N.Y.S.2d 368
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (dissenting opinion's reasoning adopted on appeal to New York Court of
Appeals, 468 N.E.2d 54 (N.Y. 1984)). In disciplinary cases, "operative standard requires that the
educational institution proceed in accordance with its own rules and guidelines." Iti at 370.
272- 404 N.E.2d 1302 (N.Y. 1980).
27 3 See id at 1306.
' Id One state court concluded that due process requires adherence to such internal rules if
they affect individual rights. Armesto v. Weidner, 615 So. 2d 707,709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
s See Lightsey v. King, 567 F. Supp. 645,650 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[Submission... of a charge
of cheating to the Honor Board, followed by [a] refusal to abide by their verdict, prompts the Court
to question the [institution's] good faith as to this entire affair.").
2' See ike at 648.
z See Foo v. Ind. Univ., 88 F. Supp. 2d 937,952 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
2 Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302,1304 (N.Y. 1980). See text accompanying note
269 etseq. Academic decisions, on the other hand, involve more evaluative and subjective judgments
less adapted to administrative and judicial factfinding. See Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78,90 (1978); Van de Zilverv. Rutgers Univ., 971 F. Supp. 925,932 (D.N.J. 1997);
Disesa v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., 79 F.3d 92,95 (8th Cir. 1996); Frabotta v. Meridia Huron Hosp. Sch.
of Nursing, 657 N.E.2d 816,819 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Lucas v. Hahn, 648 A.2d 839,842 (Vt. 1994);
Dillingham v. Univ. of Colo., Bd. of Regents, 790 P.2d 851, 854 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
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in disciplinary cases, however, courts remain sensitive to excessive interference with
the decisions of educational officials and will not void such decisions merely because
they lack wisdom or compassion.79 Such sensitivity pervades not only the
assessment of whether a violation occurred, but also the determination of any
remedy.' One federal district court has urged that judicial intervention be sought,
if possible, when equitable remedies could preclude the irreparable injury that might
otherwise occasion damage claims; equitable relief, said the court, better protects
both the student and the functioning of the institution.
2 81
After all is said and done, then, what process should an institution prescribe
for dealing with student miscreance? In his unusual memorandum order in the
mysteriously named A v. C. CollegesauJudge Vincent Broderick, after informing the
reader that the case had been settled, offered his advice. For cases threatening a
permanent record entry, suspension, or expulsion, colleges and universities should
consider the following procedures: 1) an impartial decisionmaker-the person may
be an employee of the institution so long as not previously involved in the case; 2)
notice to the accused student of the substance of the allegations and of the possible
penalties; 3) provision to the student of an opportunity to appear at the hearing and
to provide, reasonably in advance of the hearing, evidence the student intends to
offer at the hearing; 4) an opportunity on the part of the student to suggest witnesses
whom the decisionmaker might interview and possible questions that might be
" See Foo, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 957 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,326 (1975)). When
the focus is on the act of a governmental official, as opposed to legislation, "only the most egregious
official conduct" is arbitrary in the constitutional sense." Id at 960 (quoting Dunn v. Fairfield Cmty.
High Sch. Dist. No. 225,158 F.3d 962,965 (7th Cir. 1998)) (quoting in tum County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,846 (1998)). Seegenral/Robert Gilbert Johnston &Jane Curtis Oswald,Aademic
Dishones.: RetokingAcademic Credentials, 32J. MARSHALLL REV. 67 (1998); Audrey Wolfson LaTourett
& Robert D. KingJu&da/Inten'ntion in theStkdent-Uxiversiy Relationship: Due Process and Contract Theories,
65 U. DaT. L REV. 199 (1988); David M. Rabban, Note, Judal Review of the Universiy-Student
Re/ationso: Expulsion and Governance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 95 (1973).
" See A. v. C. Coll., 863 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901
S.W.2d 926, 931 (Tex. 1995) (finding that the case was disciplinary, not academic, the federal district
court noted, "The courts should tread lightly in fashioning remedies for due process violations that
affect the academic decisions of state-supported universities." It at 934.); Harris v. Trustees of
Columbia Univ., 470 N.Y.S.2d 368,375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (dissenting opinion, adopted by court
of appeals in 468 N.E.2d 54 (N.Y. 1984)). Cf Olsson v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 402 N.E.2d 1150,1154
(1980). In this academic case, the court inveighed against "diploma by estoppel," at least when a less
drastic remedy like re-testing might be employed without seriously disrupting the student's academic
or professional development. "[Tihe judicial awarding of an academic diploma is an extreme remedy
which should be reserved for the most egregious of circumstances." Id
2"' See C. CL, 863 F. Supp. at 158 (noting that damage suits might intimidate academic
decisionmakers).
'm See id at 156.
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addressed to them; 5) avoidance of sanctions against witnesses merely because of the
implausibility of, or inconsistency in, their testimony-such discipline may deter
"unpopular" though "truthful" testimony; and 6) an option for the accused student
to accept discipline voluntarily or, after sufficient time to secure pertinent advice, to
request a ruling from the decisionmaker.2 3 Judge Broderick wielded a nice mix of
carrot and stick in concluding-
It is not intended to be suggested here that these possible aspects of fair
procedure should be mandated by judicial decision in public or private
sector institutions, but rather [that] their adoption might be relevant to
judicial willingness to accept institutional decisions if found subject to
challenge notwithstanding the drawbacks of judicial intervention.2 4
In our litigious society, institutions too often think only of what the law requires
them to do. But the law sets only the minimal standard of human behavior, not the
preferred."5 Institutions, acting in this context through their lawyers and student-
affairs personnel, should focus as well on doing what is right, whether or not
specifically mandated by law. Students, after all, are decidedly not the enemy, but
rather the core of the institution.
B. Academic
As indicated earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court seems to have dispensed with
the requirement of a hearing for academic cases, though the decision involved must
be "careful and deliberate."2 Substantive due process, even if applicable to the
higher education context, largely overlaps the procedural requirement, decreeing that
the result in academic matters be reached conscientiously and with careful
deliberation; institutional judgments will not be overturned unless they represent
"such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that
the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional
judgment."' ' 7
m See id at 158-59.
24 Id at 159.
' Cf. Hennessey v. City of Melrose, 194 F.3d 237,252 n.5 (1st Cir. 1999). After noting that
the Constitution does not require a hearing in academic cases, the court added: "This is not to say that
a hearing of some sort might not have provided [the institution] with a slightly different gloss on what
exactly had transpired at Horace Mann. Our concern, however, is with constitutional imperatives, not
with best practices."
- Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78,87 (1978).
Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,225 (1985).
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How have the lower courts implemented these sentiments? They in turn
have consistently set a rather low threshold for institutions in such cases.28 As the
Fourth Circuit has said, "The limit of judicial inquiry into academic administration
is early reached." 9 Another federal court, noting that procedural requirements for
academic cases remain "so minimal," concluded that in "only extremely rare
situations" would an institution's actions violate procedural due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment °  Referring to academic controversies, the Georgia
Supreme Court has said, "Absent plain necessity impelled by a deprivation of major
proportion, the hand of the judicial branch . . . must be withheld.""1  Such
pronouncements, echoing the U.S. Supreme Court, have stressed that the
institution's academic judgment yields only if not "careful and deliberate,"' 2 or if
"arbitrary or capricious,"-"3 irrational, 4 motivated by bad faith or ill will, "beyond
286 Some courts have reached similar results without allusion to the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g.,
Bhandari v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., No. 00.CIV.1735-JGK, 2000 WL 310344 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 27,
2000); Garg v. Albert Einstein Coll. of Med. of Yeshiva Univ., 747 F. Supp. 231,236 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(state law); Hernandez v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 971, 973 (N.J. 1997) (contract); and Shuman v.
Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., 451 N.W.2d 71, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that academic cases
require less process than disciplinary ones).
9 Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69,72 (4th Cir. 1983).
. Amelunxen v. Univ. of P.R., 637 F. Supp. 426,431 (D.P.R. 1986). The court continued that
any reversal in such cases would come under the aegis of substantive due process. See id See also
Harris v. Blake, 798 F.2d 419,423 (10th Cir. 1986) (requiring only "minimal procedures" due); Qvyjt
v. Lin, 932 F. Supp. 1100,1106 (N.D. M1.1997) (only "minimal" process required); Lewin v. Med. Coll.
of Hampton Roads, 910 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1996) (noting that procedures in academic
cases far less stringent than in disciplinary ones); Reilly v. Daly, 666 N.E.2d 439, 444 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that only the "barest procedural protections" needed for academic dismissal); Frabotta
v. Meridia Huron Hosp. Sch. of Nursing, 657 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding less
process required in academic cases than in disciplinary). Cf Alcom v. Vaksman, 877 S.W.2d 390,397
(Tex. App. 1994) (noting that less stringent procedures in academic matter) (applying Texas parallel
to Due Process Clause). In A/can, the court noted that if evidence supports the trial court's finding
of institutional bad faith or ill will, the deferential standard for academic dismissals does not apply on
appeal. See id
2' Woodruffv. Ga. State Univ., 304 S.E.2d 697, 699 (Ga. 1983).
Perez v. Univ. of Charleston, 201 F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 1999) (percriam) (unpublished); W'ilde
v. Komar, 185 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished); Wheeler v. Miller, 168 F.3d 241,248 (5th Cir.
1999); Disesa v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., 79 F.3d 92,95 (8th Cir. 1996); Harris, 798 F.2d at 423; Schuler
v. Univ. of Minn., 788 F.2d 510,513(8th Cir. 1986); Rossomando v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb.,
2 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1229 (D. Neb. 1998); Lisin, 910 F. Supp. at 1167; Saville v. Houston County
Healthcare Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512, 1537 (M.D. Ala. 1994); Mohammed v. Mathog, 635 F. Supp.
748,752 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
' Vide, 185 F.3d 872; Crook v. Baker, 813 F.2d 88, 100 (6th Cir. 1987); Schukr, 788 F.2d at
515; Stevens v. Hunt, 646 F.2d 1168,1170 (6th Cir. 1981); Stoller v. CoIl. of Med., 562 F. Supp. 403,
412 (M.D. Pa. 1983); Amxeunxex, 637 F. Supp. at 431; Hubbard v.John Tyler Cmty. Coll., 455 F. Supp.
753,755 (E.D. Va. 1978); Williams v. State Univ. of N. Y.-Health Sci Ctr., 674 N.Y.S.2d 702 (N.Y.
Dutie2001]
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the pale of reasoned academic decisionmaking," 2 ' "such a substantial departure from
accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee
responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment,"2 7 or in violation of a
statute or the Constitution." Moreover, the burden of proof in such cases normally
lies with the student. 9 (One layer of deference may get superimposed on another:
In close cases a court may accede even to the institution's determination that a matter
is academic rather than disciplinary!)m' Nonetheless, as the Second Circuit reminds
App. Div. 1998); Moukarzcl v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 662 N.Y.S.2d 281,282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997);
Illickal v. Roman, 653 N.Y.S.2d 562,563 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Frabotia, 657 N.E.2d at 819; Rafman
v. Brooklyn Coll., 623 N.Y.S.2d 281,282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Alanis v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci
Ctr., 843 S.W.2d 779,784 (Tex. App. 1992); Tobias v. Univ. of Tex., 824 S.W.2d 201,210 (rex. App.
1991); cf Ross v. Univ. of Minn., 439 N.W.2d 28,34 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). "Arbitrary or capricious"
means an institutional decision lacking a rational basis or motivated by bad faith or ill will unrelated
to academic performance. Scbuer, 788 F.2d at 515; Stevens, 646 F.2d at 1170.
' See Diesa, 79 F.3d at 95; Rossomando, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1229; Doe v. Wash. Univ., 780 F. Supp.
628, 631 (E.D. Mo. 1991); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360, 1371 (E.D. Pa.
1985); Wiiams, 674 N.Y.S.2d 702; MoukaRel, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 282; II/lckaz 653 N.Y.S.2d at 563;
Rafman, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 282; Aansr, 843 S.W.2d at 789; Tobias, 824 S.W.2d at 210 (ending substantive
due process inquiry when any evidence of a rational basis is presented).
215 See Disesa, 79 F.3d at 95; Haberle v. Univ. of Ala., 803 F.2d 1536, 1540 (11th Cir. 1986);
Schukr, 788 F.2d at 515; Rossomando, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1229; Doe, 780 F. Supp. at 631; Moukael, 662
N.Y.S.2d at 282; Ilickal, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 563; Rafman, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 282;Alanis, 843 S.W.2d at 784.
Cf Williams, 674 N.Y.S.2d 702; Alcvrn, 877 S.W.2d at 412-13 (holding that expulsion motivated by bad
faith and ill will violated Texas Constitution's parallel to federal Due Process Clause).
' Hennessy v. City of Melrose, 194 F.3d 237, 252 (lst Cir. 1999) (citing Endhg, 474 U.S. at 227-
28); Cobb v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 84 F. Supp. 2d 740,748-49 (W.D. Va. 2000).
2W Wheeler, 168 F.3d at 250 (citing Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225); Haberl, 803 F.2d at 1540; Hanrs,
798 F.2d at 425; Van de Zilver v. Rutgers Univ., 971 F. Supp. 925, 934 (D.N.J. 1997); Carboni v.
Meldrum, 949 F. Supp. 427,438 (W.D. Va. 1996); Lewin, 910 F. Supp. at 1167; Savile, 852 F. Supp.
at 1537; Doe, 780 F. Supp. at 631;Amxehnxen, 637 F. Supp. at 431; Bruner v. Petersen, 944 P.2d 43,48
(Alaska 1997); Lekutis v. Univ. of Osteopathic Med. and Health Sciences, 524 N.W.2d 410, 413 (Iowa
1994); Dillingham v. Univ. of Colo., Bd. of Regents, 790 P.2d 851, 854 (Colo. App. 1989); C. Ho v.
Univ. of Tex., 984 S.W.2d 672,684 (rex. App. 1998); Brown v. Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr., 957 S.W.2d
911,916 (rex. 1997) (calling minimal professional judgment enough);Alans, 843 S.W.2d at 789; Tobias,
824 S.W.2d at 211; Ross, 439 N.W.2d at 34; Eiland v. Wolf, 764 S.W.2d 827, 835 (Tex. App. 1989)
(finding evidence of minimal professional judgment must rule against student as matter of law).
" SeeAmunxen, 637 F. Supp. at 431; . Wilams, 674 N.Y.S.2d 702; Mouk.a7, 662 N.Y.S.2d
at 282 (citation omitted); Ilckal, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 563; Rafman, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
1 See Mauriello v. Univ. of Med. and Dentistry of N.J., 781 F.2d 46,51 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[A]
student bears a heavy burden in persuading the courts to set aside a faculty's judgment of academic
performance."); Frabotta v. Meridia Huron Hosp. Sch. of Nursing, 657 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995).
o See Nickerson v. Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, 975 P.2d 46, 53 (Alaska 1999).
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us, Horowitz did not put even academic cases beyond the reach of judicial
intervention; "at least some modicum of process" is due. 3
1
The ultimate judgment in these cases may really reflect whether the
reviewing court feels that, all things considered, the institution treated the student
fairly-- 2 In fact, perhaps because in so many cases the institution's treatment of the
student has seemed fundamentally fair, the courts have not had to wrestle with the
slender but real differences among the standards used. To consider just two of those
standards, "careful and deliberate" does not mean the same as "not arbitrary and
capricious." To be sure, in most situations, including many that have reached the
courts, treatment of the student is both or neither. Nonetheless, some level of
attention paid by a professor to the student's bluebook or research paper, for
example, might fall short of being "careful and deliberate" without being "arbitrary
and capricious;" these do not seem to be contiguous on the spectrum of concern
manifested by the institutional decisionmaker. "Careful and deliberate" conveys a
significantly higher level of consideration than does any of the other standards
referred to in the academic due process cases.
Not surprisingly, in cases labeled academic, virtually all courts have found
a hearing unnecessary' 0-- if not useless and harmfud4--although some courts have
, Ezekwo v. NYC Health and Hosp. Corp., 940 F.2d 775,784 (2d Cir. 1991). Of course, even
a courtroom victory does not guarantee the student academic success. One federal court, though
denying the institution summary judgment, candidly acknowledged the daunting challenge students
may face in such cases: "Ms. Bergstrom is engaged in a war which cannot be won. If the medical
school faculty has in fact determined that she should not be a graduate of the school, no performance
level on the remaining courses will prove to be satisfactory. No coerced unilateral resolution appears
possible." Bergstrom v. Buettner, 697 F. Supp. 1098,1102 (D.N.D. 1987).
m See Harris, 798 F.2d at 424; Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69,72 (4th
Cir. 1983).
13 See Hennessyv. City of Melrose, 194 F.3d 237,250 (lstCir. 1999); Hankins v. Temple Univ.
Health Sciences Ctr., 829 F.2d 437, 445 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding that informal faculty evaluation
suffices); .audelk, 781 F.2d at 51 (informal faculty evaluation suffices); Haberle v. Univ. of Ala., 803
F.2d 1536,1539 (11th Cir. 1986) ('The fact that the procedures used were ad hoc does not violate the
HorowitZ standard; no formal hearing is required."); Cobb v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 84 F. Supp. 2d
740, 749 (W.D. Va. 2000) (dictum); Van d Zilwvr, 971 F. Supp. at 931 (ditum); Lean, 910 F. Supp. at
1165 (holding that since no hearing was needed, neither was counsel); Sat/k, 852 F. Supp. at 1537 (no
formal hearing required); Alexander v. Kennedy-King Coll., No. 88 C 2117, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14997 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 2, 1990); Mohammed v. Mathog, 635 F. Supp. 748, 752 (E.D. Mich. 1986)
(holding that student need not have attended meeting at which his dismissal for academic reasons was
decided upon); Rafmtan, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 283 (no "fuill hearing" needed); Lucas v. Hahn, 648 A.2d 839,
842 (Vt. 1994) (requiring no formal hearing); Dilngha, 790 P.2d at 854 (requiring no formal hearing);
Ross, 439 N.W.2d at 34. Cf. Davis v. Mann, 882 F.2d 967, 974 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that full
procedural protections of Fourteenth Amendment unnecessary even though dismissal from residency
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alluded approvingly to the fact that a hearing however unnecessary, had taken place
in the case at bar.305 Obviously, even though constitutionally superfluous, a hearing,
and other forms of administrative review, make it still more likely that the
institution will overcome the low hurdle represented by the criteria cited above.
Since a hearing need not be provided in academic cases, it would be, as the Eighth
Circuit has pointed out, anomalous to require institutions to preserve a record of the
oral exam whose failure occasioned the graduate student's dismissal. °7 The lack of
any need for a hearing equally precludes the student's right to be present when others
testify before the grade-appeals committee.0 8 Just as in disciplinary cases, courts, in
dealing with academic matters, may shield decisionmakers with a presumption of
integrity." The fact that the dean selected the members of a committee called upon
to deal with such matters raises no constitutional problem."'
program also amounted to dismissal from employment; primary purpose of program was academic
training and academic certification); Miller v. Hamline Univ. Sch. of Law, 601 F.2d 970,972 (8th Cir.
1979); Dietz v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 479 F. Supp. 554, 558 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Ho v. Univ. of Tex. at
Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672,684 (Tex. App. 1998). Hernandez v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 971,976
(N.J. 1997) (holding that contract between private hospital and resident required only a "fair
procedure"); Tobias, 824 S.W.2d at 209-10.
Io4 See Antlwnxen, 637 F. Supp. at 431 ("[A] hearing may be helpful to ascertain a student's
misconduct but is useless or harmful to find out the truth as to scholarship.!).
I See Haberlk, 803 F.2d at 1539; Hars, 798 F.2d at 423; Rossomando v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Neb., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1223,1229 n.2 (D. Neb. 1998); Van de Zilve, 971 F. Supp. at 934; Moire
v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360,1374-75 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
3" See Disesa v. St. Louis Cmty. Col., 79 F.3d 92, 95 (8th Cir. 1996); Harys, 798 F.2d at 423;
Wilkenfield v. Powell, 577 F. Supp. 579, 583-84 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
3" See Schuler v. Univ. of Minn., 788 F.2d 510, 514 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that the university
did in fact provide a hearing, though not required).
0 SeeIkpeazu v. Univ. ofNeb.,775 F.2d 250,254(8th Cir. 1985). Cf. Moukarzel v. Montefiore
Med. Ctr., 662 N.Y.S.2d 281,283 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that academic cases, which require
less process than disciplinary ones, entail no right to question the academic committee, to introduce
evidence, or to present witnesses); Hall v. Johnstone, 620 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
(holding that in academic case, no right to cross-examine witness or to a transcript of proceeding
before appellate faculty panel).
I0 See Ikpeaiu, 775 F.2d at 254; Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 763 F. Supp. 995, 999 (N.D. Ind.
1991) (holding that absent establishment of actual bias, school officials in highly sophisticated academic
discipline entitled to presumption of honesty and integrity).
311 See IkpieaV, 775 F.2d at 254.
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The concept of notice has played a prominent role in these cases." In
Schuler v. University of Minnesota,"' the Eighth Circuit required that the student have
prior notice of both the institutional unhappiness with her performance and the
threat of dismissal 13 This requirement has been tied to the very notion of the
academic: "If the university's interests are truly academic rather than disciplinary in
nature, its emphasis should be on correcting behavior through faculty suggestion,
coercion, and forewarning rather than punishing behavior after the fact" 314 Such an
approach requires that notice come early enough to give the student a "reasonable
opportunity" to correct any deficient performance before dismissal becomes
inevitable." That notice might come from the receipt of unsatisfactory grades
during the course.316
Most institutions give students second, and even further, chances to redress
their academic performances. In so doing, these institutions convey the very kind
of notice-the rehabilitative notice-discussed by the courts. Nonetheless, there
presumably remain cases where notice-preliminary and final-comes before any
performance by the student. May not a law school, for example, set out in its bulletin
a rule requiring immediate dismissal of anyone falling short of a 1.0 grade point
average at the end of the first semester (with probation, say, for those between 1.0
and 2.0)? Surely the clear warning in the rule-together with the assessment
occurring through the four or five end-of-semester examinations-provides enough
protection to meet the "careful and deliberate" criterion and, afortio, the other due
process standards as well. The chance to reform talk, though, suggests that even
students running afoul of the 1.0 minimum constitutionally merit another chance.
3" See Ezekwo v. NYC Health and Hosp. Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 1991) (entitling
ophthalmology resident to notice of change in criteria for selecting "Chief Resident"); c. Hernandez
v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 971,976 (N.J. 1997) (requiring notice of charges by contract); c. Miller
v. Hamline Univ. Sch. of Law, 601 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1979).
312 788 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1986).
m" See id. at 514. Accord Wilde v. Komar, 185 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 1999) (unreported);
Rossomando v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1223,1229 (D. Neb. 1998); Nickerson
v. Alaska Anchorage, 975 P.2d 46, 53 (Alaska 1999) (holding that Horoatz requires "more than mere
perfunctory notice rendered with or after the decision to dismiss").
314 Id
311 Id See also Wilkenfield v. Powell, 577 F. Supp. 579, 584 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (noting that
student learned of faculty's dissatisfaction well before decision to drop him from doctoral psychology
program).
31 See Disesa v. St Louis Cmty. Coil., 79 F.3d 92, 95 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that notice of
deficient performance provided the student by five quizzes making up seventy-five percent of her
grade, combined with administrative review of that grade, more than satisfied procedural due process).
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Horowitzand Ewing, it is submitted, anticipate no such strait jacketing of the
institution. Indeed, to deny that option may well, under the law of unintended
consequences, cause the institution to reduce its number of risky admissions-so
some applicants who would have had one chance under the 1.0 rule would get none.
It may be that cases setting out a requirement that students be given an opportuity
to reform academically arose in a context that anticipates such second opportunities,
or that the fact of a second chance proved helpful in buttressing the court's
conclusion that the institution had been careful and deliberate. The Supreme Court
of South Dakota put the point well, concluding that the student in academic-sanction
cases need only be given notice, in any form, of his failure or pending failure.
3t7
As in disciplinary cases, courts in academic situations have been
constitutionally unmoved by the failure of a college or university to follow its internal
rules."' In Rossomando v. Board of Regents of Univernsi of Nebraska,'9 for example, a
student dismissed from a postgraduate dental program complained that her hearing,
in violation of the university's internal rules, had not been recorded. The court
replied: ale failure to record was an oversight .... In any event, she was given
more process than she was due and the failure to follow the internal rules is not itself
actionable as a federal constitutional claim."3"
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has done a disservice to both lower courts and higher
education in failing to specify, at least in broad strokes, the nature of the interest that
qualifies for due process protection. This lapse, as we have seen, has led many courts
to assume such an interest and, in the bargain, to decide the constitutional adequacy
of the process applied to the student. Perhaps the Court should clearly and finally
117 See Delaney v. Heimstra, 288 N.W.2d 769, 772 (S.D. 1980) (citing Gaspar v. Burton, 513
F.2d 843,851 (10th Cir. 1975)). See Frabotta v. Meridia Huron Hasp. Sch. of Nursing, 657 N.E.2d 816,
819 (Ohio Ct App. 1995) (denying a student the chance to improve was not violation of due process);
cf Van de Zilver v. Rutgers Univ., 971 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D. N.J. 1997) (holding that, in academic
cases, due process requires no more than an informal faculty evaluation with the student prior to
dismissal) (citing Hankins v. Temple Univ. Health Sciences Ctr., 829 F.2d 437,445 (3d Cir. 1987)).
311 See Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 92, n.8; Disesa, 79 F.3d at
95; Schukr, 788 F.2d at 515; Rossomando, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1228; Amelunxen v. Univ. of P.R., 637 F.
Supp. 426,432-33 (D.P.R. 1986); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360,1376 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (dictum). But failure to follow internal rules might breach the contract between institution
and student. See Garg v. Albert Einstein Coll. of Med. of Yeshiva Univ., 747 F. Supp. 231, 236
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). But set Horoufit 435 U.S. at 108, n.22 (opinion ofJustice Marshall, concurring and
dissenting).
""' 2 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (D. Neb. 1998).
320 Id at 1229.
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hold that the liberty or property triggering protection under procedural due process
also prompts protection under substantive due process; this would seem to reflect
most dearly the specific language of the clause. The Court could then limit liberty
or property to substantial invasions of state protected interests-long suspensions,
dismissals, loss of significant financial aid, serious stigma, and the like.
If disinclined toward this resolution, the Court should adopt the position set
out by Justice Powell, concurring in Ewing, that substantive due process rights are
created only by the federal Constitution, not by state law. 21 Such an approach would
remove substantive due process formally from the typical academic or disciplinary
case, even when serious sanctions such as suspension and dismissal are in play. Such
a change would have little significant impact on such cases, of course. As we have
seen, violations of substantive due process require, besides a suitable interest, a
decision reflecting such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to
demonstrate that the faculty did not exercise professional judgment. Though the
Court has made clear that procedural due process does not require "hearings"
regarding adverse academic decisions, it is difficult-at least without edging into
fantasy-to hypothesize an institutional decision that would violate substantive due
process even as it satisfies procedural due process. Perhaps an obviously arbitrary
rule-for example, only those students of a certain height may graduate-attended
by elaborate procedures to determine that the student comes within the rule, might
be such a situation. In the real world, even rules easily disagreed with will inevitably
fall short of reflecting such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms
as to demonstrate that the faculty did not exercise professional judgment. Telling is
the rarity with which substantive due process challenges succeed independently of
procedural due process. Ironically, then, the distinction itself turns out to be...
academic. The modification would cleanse the constitutional law in this area of a
lingering uncertainty that has caused confusion, needless briefing, argument and
judicial decision making, and perhaps even additional federal litigation. (In Eing, for
example, the student's federal claim relied only on an alleged violation of substantive
due process).32
With regard to the procedures institutions deploy for aberrant students,
contested disciplinary cases that threaten serious sanctions warrant appropriate notice
of the charged misconduct and of the rules allegedly violated; a hearing, conducted
by unbiased decisionmakers and allowing the student to confront adverse evidence
and present favorable evidence; and formal findings and conclusions. The
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opportunity for at least one appeal challenging the conduct of the hearing should be
required. Such a process, though rudimentary, meets the constitutional requirements
specified or implied by the courts. Of course, nothing prevents an institution from
employing more sophisticated procedures.
With regard to academic cases, the courts have taken an essentially hands-off
approach, deferring to the academic expertise of campus officials. Given the rules
typically controlling academic probation, suspension, and dismissal at American
colleges and universities, and the large number of judgments that normally must
concur in such cases, the judicial overturning of campus decisions will rarely occur.
The overwhelming number of such matters will easily clear the "careful and
deliberate" bar, let alone the other, still less demanding criteria of due process.
